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WHAT’S MONEY GOT TO DO WITH IT?:
PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING AND PROFIT
KATHRYN A. SABBETH†
ABSTRACT
Definitions of “public interest lawyering” influence financial support, regulation of lawyers, and professional identity. This Article examines three contexts in which legal institutions have operationalized the
concept of public interest lawyering: tax exemptions, exceptions to solicitation prohibitions, and fee-shifting statutes. The Article critiques the
common conception of public interest lawyering as work provided by
non-profit organizations or through volunteer activities outside the mainstream market for legal services. It argues that interpreting public interest
lawyering as a market exception not only is incomplete but also threatens
the viability of important work.
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Public interest lawyers are too busy acting in behalf of the public interest to worry a great deal about how it is defined.
1

—Stuart A. Scheingold

INTRODUCTION
Public interest lawyering2 is a term we all know and an activity we
all support in principle.3 Yet, upon inspection, its definition remains obscure.4 A common conception is that public interest lawyering is distinct
from commercial, profit-generating practice.5 The profession identifies
public interest lawyering as work with discounted value in the regular
market for legal services.6 For the past few decades, the phrase “pro bono publico” has been used to signify services provided for free or at a
reduced rate.7 From pro bono requirements8 to public interest loan assis1. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 185 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2d ed. 2004) (1974).
2. This Article will use the terms “public interest lawyering,” “public service lawyering,”
and “pro bono lawyering” interchangeably.
3. For a description and critique of the broad support for professionals engaged in public
interest lawyering, see Dennis G. Jacobs, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Remarks Before the Rochester Lawyers Chapter of the Federalist Society: Pro Bono for Fun and
Profit
4
(Oct.
6,
2008)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/pubid.1178/pub_detail.asp).
4. See David Luban, Taking out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest
Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 210 n.1 (2003) (“By ‘public-interest law,’ I do not mean ‘law
practiced on behalf of the public interest.’ That usage would make the phrase completely tendentious, because people disagree fundamentally over what the public interest is.”).
5. See Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 2106–10
(2004) (describing how the legal profession constructs the dichotomy between public interest lawyering and financial earnings).
6. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct describe “pro bono publico” as “a professional
responsibility to provide . . . services to those unable to pay.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 6.1 (2012). The services are to be provided “without fee or expectation of fee,” or at a “substantially reduced fee.” R. 6.1(a), (b). A statutorily-awarded fee for pro bono activity should be donated,
at least in part. R. 6.1(a) cmt. 4.
7. See Erichson, supra note 5, at 2108–09 (highlighting that “pro bono publico” has come to
mean “lawyering for no fee” rather than lawyering “for the public good”).
8. See, e.g., In the Public Interest: Pro Bono Requirement, TUL. U. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.tulane.edu/PublicInterest/index.aspx?id=12020 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (defining
“pro bono work” as services “on behalf of indigent persons or with non-profit, public interest organizations that serve the community”); Public Service: JD Requirement, U. PA. L. SCH.,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/publicservice/pro-bono/jd-requirement.php (last visited Feb. 12, 2014)
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tance programs,9 institutions have relied on non-profit status or the absence of fees as a key indicator of lawyering for the public good. A handful of scholars have pointed to private, for-profit firms whose work complicates the picture,10 but leaders of the profession continue to perceive a
dichotomy between public interest lawyering and profit, and they continue to perpetuate that perspective.11 This Article builds on previous scholars’ research to question whether profit should play a role in assessing
the public value of lawyers’ work. Further, this Article suggests that interpreting public interest lawyering as a market exception not only is
incomplete, but, moreover, it threatens the viability of important categories of work.
It must be recognized at the outset that the common conception of
public interest lawyering as free or low-cost legal services is not the
product of a historical accident; it reflects an intentional emphasis on
access to representation.12 The access perspective starts from the premise
that a core public obligation of the legal profession is to provide equal
access to the legal system without regard for any client’s status or viewpoint.13 Many have interpreted public interest lawyering to mean increas(defining “pro bono” as “uncompensated, voluntary work that yields a public benefit,” including
work “with community, government, or non-profit organizations” or individuals “unable to pay for
legal services”); Pro Bono, VINSON & ELKINS, http://www.velaw.com/overview/ProBono.aspx (last
visited Feb. 12, 2014) (defining pro bono work as “free legal service . . . to those in need”); Pro
Bono News: NY Firm Adopts Internal Mandatory Pro Bono Policy, LEGAL SERVS. NOW (ABA Div.
for Bar Servs. & Div. for Legal Servs.), Jan. 7, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/legal_services_now/legalservices_sclaid_ls
n_docs_LSN200501.authcheckdam.pdf (announcing firm’s mandatory pro bono policy requiring
free services to indigent clients).
9. See HEATHER WELLS JARVIS, EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS, FINANCING THE FUTURE:
RESPONSES TO THE RISING DEBT OF LAW STUDENTS 12, 21 (Cindy Adcock et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006),
available
at
http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/sites/default/files/financing-the-future2006.pdf;
Philip G. Schrag & Charles W. Pruett, Coordinating Loan Repayment Assistance Programs with
New Federal Legislation, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 583, 587–90 (2011).
10. See, e.g., ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 169–200 (2013); Scott L. Cummings & Ann Southworth, Between
Profit and Principle: The Private Public Interest Firm, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 183 (Robert Granfield &
Lynn Mather eds., 2009); Louise Trubek & M. Elizabeth Kransberger, Critical Lawyers: Social
Justice and the Structures of Private Practice, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 201, 201 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
11. See infra Parts I and II.
12. NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980S AND
BEYOND 3 (1989) (“Public interest law is the name given to efforts to provide legal representation to
interests that historically have been unrepresented or underrepresented in the legal process. Philosophically, public interest law rests on the assumption that many significant segments of society are
not adequately represented in the courts, Congress, or the administrative agencies, because they are
either too poor or too diffuse to obtain legal representation in the marketplace.”); Oliver A. Houck,
With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1448–50 (1984) (describing “access for unrepresented
issues to the judicial system” as the rationale for and definition of public interest practice); Louise G.
Trubek, Public Interest Law: Facing the Problems of Maturity, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
417, 421–22 (2011) (describing the Ford Foundation’s use of “‘market failure’ economic literature”
to justify the development of non-profit, public interest law firms).
13. See Erichson, supra note 5, at 2119 n.140; see also John D. Colombo, The Role of Access
in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 343, 362–63 (2004) (articulating an access-based
vision of public interest law).
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ing access to the legal system for those persons or interests that are “underrepresented” in the regular market for services.14 Persons may be underrepresented because they cannot afford to pay market rates for representation, or interests may be underrepresented because, though important for the public at large, they are not attached to economic incentives sufficient to attract private litigants. Providing free or low-cost services to these underrepresented persons and interests corrects for failures
of the market.
The access perspective embodies an important equality aspiration
and should not be abandoned, but, without more, the emphasis on access
to services results in an incomplete definition of public interest lawyering.15 All lawyers serve the interests of some portion of the public,16 but
few would suggest that all lawyering is public interest lawyering.17 Under the access perspective, the absence of market incentives or sufficient
subsidies creates a scarcity of lawyers for certain persons and interests,
and the provision of free or low-cost services to fill that gap is therefore a
public service, like an act of charity.18 While market undervaluation
could be one part of the equation, recommending subsidies wherever
there is a shortage of funding,19 market undervaluation does not tell us
which work is substantively worth funding, beyond the notion that all
lawyering has social value and should be distributed evenly.20 Notably,
the emphasis on access suggests that all lawyering is equally valuable
and that even distribution of legal services promotes social equality (or
some other, more important, social goal).
Beyond the view that serving any subset of the public is a public
service, however, there remains a question as to which categories of lawyering should be specially recognized as public interest lawyering.21
14. Scott L. Cummings, Privatizing Public Interest Law, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1–2
(2012) (internal quotation mark omitted); Luban, supra note 4, at 210 n.1.
15. See David R. Esquivel, Note, The Identity Crisis in Public Interest Law, 46 DUKE L.J.
327, 342–43 (1996).
16. Conservative lawyers see themselves as protecting important public interests. For example, the lawyer opposing an environmental group might believe she is the protector of jobs for loggers, just as the anti-New Deal lawyers believed they were fighting oppressive governmental overreach. See Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of “Public
Interest Law,” 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1251–52 (2005).
17. See Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1071 n.3 (1970).
18. See Houck, supra note 12, at 1419–20, 1448 (describing the development of public interest law organizations as “public charities” that improve “access” for “underrepresented” and “underfinanced interests”).
19. See Erichson, supra note 5, at 2110 (suggesting that defining public interest lawyering in
terms of low pay or market underrepresentation is appropriate for subsidies).
20. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (1986) (proposing that as long as the
lawyer does not facilitate unlawful conduct, “what the lawyer does is a social good,” even if it may
not be morally good); cf. David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 644 (1986).
21. Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold prefer the term “cause lawyering.” See STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND
CAUSE LAWYERING 3–7 (2004). They argue that the term “public interest” begs the question of
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Which lawyering has a special social value? This question raises controversy, particularly in a democratic society with a constitutional framework that purposefully embraces government neutrality and avoids defining a substantive conception of public good.22
Nonetheless, institutions do construct definitions of public interest
lawyering on a regular basis, and should do so on the basis of candid and
thorough deliberations. The definitional question tackled in this Article is
not purely academic; it carries implications for professional identity,
regulation, and financial support. With respect to the identity of the profession, it pushes us to consider what kind of professional work is in the
public interest and what is expected from the profession as a whole. 23
With respect to regulation of the profession, this inquiry could inform
whether to hold public interest lawyers to higher standards and when, if
ever, to exempt them from professional requirements that hamper their
work.24 Lastly, the definition carries implications regarding financial
support,25 including grants from governmental or private sources, loan
repayment or forgiveness by law schools or lenders, summer stipends for
students, and entire years of salaries paid by corporate law firms that
defer their incoming classes and encourage recent recruits to pursue work
in the public interest.26 Grappling with the definition of public interest
lawyering means considering which behavior the profession should encourage when it confers reputational advantages and formal awards, and
which behavior it should require when it adopts pro bono mandates.27
defining the public and what is in the public’s interest, and leaves unexamined the tension between
serving private clients and serving the public good. Id. at 5–6. Cause lawyering is clear about its
chief priority: commitment to social, political, or economic principles, such that serving the client is
but one component of serving the cause. Cause lawyering literature has made an enormous contribution in shifting moral and political commitments from the margins to the core of legal ethics, and it
has been radical in suggesting that service to a client could be secondary to another purpose. Moreover, it has been thoughtful in focusing on attorneys’ motivations, rather than any pecuniary indicator,
to distinguish cause lawyering. Yet the inclusiveness of this framework is also its weakness: it fails
to indicate which kinds of lawyering activities are in the public interest, beyond recognizing those
activities the lawyers performing them say should be so recognized. See Luban, supra note 4, at 210
n.1 (defining public interest lawyers with two limiting criteria, one based on lawyers’ motives and
the other based on representing the underrepresented, with the latter criterion excluding “self-styled”
public interest lawyers who represent well-funded corporate interests). This Article suggests that
legal institutions need to make substantive determinations as to which work deserves special support,
based on priorities defined by those institutions.
22. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 25–54, 71–79 (1996).
23. See infra Part I (describing implications for professional identity); see also Lincoln
Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, at SR10.
24. See infra Part II.B (describing exception to solicitation prohibition).
25. See, e.g., infra Part II.A (describing tax benefits), II.C (describing fee-shifting provisions).
26. PRO BONO INST., LAW FIRM DEFERRED ASSOCIATES AND PUBLIC INTEREST
PLACEMENTS: SURVEY REPORT AND PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 4 (2010), available at
http://www.probonoinst.org/wpps/wp-content/uploads/deferred_associates_survey_2010.pdf;
COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 217–338 (1976) (describing funding sources for public interest law).
27. States have begun experimenting with pro bono requirements. New York is the first to
adopt one. 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.16 (2013).
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This Article calls for renewed efforts to fashion positive visions of
public interest lawyering defined by more than the absence of resources.
A central question is whether public interest lawyering means any representation that increases access to legal services or, instead, law practice
that promotes particular substantive values. This Article argues that the
former approach is incomplete. Rather than use profit status, fee restrictions, or client indigency as a litmus test of public value, we should
come to terms with what our public values are. To be clear, this Article
does not suggest that there can or should be one universal definition of
public interest lawyering, but that public interest lawyering does have
substantive, “institutionally specific”28 meanings, and legal actors must
take responsibility for how they apply the term. This will require making
conscious choices about priorities and not shying away from the normative and practical implications of those choices.29
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates public interest lawyering within the identity of the legal profession as a whole. Part II describes three contexts in which legal institutions operationalize public
interest lawyering: (a) tax benefits for public interest lawyering; (b) a
public interest exception to the legal profession’s prohibition of solicitation of employment; and (c) fee-shifting statutes that provide special
funding for public interest lawyering. Part III draws comparisons between the three contexts and analyzes what they reveal about the larger
definitional project. Fee-shifting statutes stand in contrast to the other
two settings. In fee-shifting statutes, elected officials have recognized
substantive definitions of public interest lawyering, acknowledged that
successful public interest practice requires financial support, and created
a mechanism to facilitate public interest lawyering for profit. Part IV
challenges the definition of public interest lawyering in opposition to
profit. It highlights empirical research that reveals alternative models of
public interest practice. Part IV suggests that there are inherent benefits
of supporting fee-based and for-profit forms of public interest work. Further, economic strength and economic power are necessary to engage in
certain categories of public interest work. Fee-shifting statutes could
offer one realistic source of that strength and power, but judges’ percep28. As Alan Chen and Scott Cummings explain in their new book:
[T]he use of “public interest law” as a label for a distinctive form of lawyering . . . retains
its power not because there is an Archimedean point by which we may judge the public
interest across the divisions of politics and culture, but rather precisely because it claims
a higher political ground, asserts a vision (or multiple visions) of the good society, and
frames the definitional question in historically grounded and institutionally specific
terms.
CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 10, at 7.
29. See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2128
(2000) (suggesting, in the context of judges’ fee decisions, that reliance on market measures of the
value of lawyers’ work is a method of attempting to avoid making substantive value assessments);
see also Sandel, supra note 22 (arguing for articulation of substantive public good).
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tions of public interest lawyering as charity currently threaten the effectiveness of these statutes. Ultimately, the view of public interest lawyering as services provided exclusively by non-profit organizations or volunteer activities, outside the market for services, threatens the viability of
lawyering in the public interest.
I. A PUBLIC PROFESSION, WITH SOME AMBIVALENCE
Mainstream discourse treats public interest lawyering as an exception to the practice of law. This begins in law schools, before lawyers
have even entered practice, when their professional identities are still
nascent. It can be seen in how many law schools maintain separate “Career Services” and “Public Interest” offices.30 It can be seen in how wellmeaning faculty and administrators encourage students to pursue pro
bono projects as an extracurricular activity, conveying the impression
that “pro bono” means a volunteer activity on the side.31 Law graduates
regularly take this conception of pro bono with them into the profession.32 They develop an impression of their profession distinct from public interest lawyering, which they view as an act of charity for when they
have the time and inclination.
Some scholars have argued that constructing the notion of public interest lawyering as an exceptional form of practice can harm the image of
the profession.33 Sarat and Scheingold have suggested that, during periods of public criticism of or suspicion about the profession, the American
Bar Association has made special efforts to embrace and highlight the
public interest work of its members, and it has done so with success.34
Including public interest activities within the scope of lawyering, and
30. See, e.g., Careers, HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/careers/index.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (Office of Public Interest Advising separate from Office of Career Services);
Office
of
Public
Interest
and
Community
Service,
GEO.
L.,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/careers/opics/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (Office of
Public Interest and Community Services separate from Office of Career Services); cf. Public Interest
Career Services, YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/publicinterestcareerservices.htm
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (specialized counseling for public interest careers available within Career
Development Office).
31.
See, e.g., Standing Comm. on Pro Bono & Pub. Serv. & the Ctr. for Pro Bono, Chart of
Law
School
Pro
Bono
Programs,
A.B.A.,
http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/probono/lawschools/pb_programs_chart.html (last updated
Sept. 23, 2013) (summarizing law schools’ extracurricular pro bono programs); see also Standing
Comm. on Pro Bono & Pub. Serv. & the Ctr. for Pro Bono, Law School Pro Bono Programs –
Awards
and
Recognition,
A.B.A.,
http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/probono/lawschools/pb_awards.html (last updated Feb. 14,
2014) (describing law schools’ awards for pro bono activity).
32. See Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255,
257 (1990). See generally Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 63, 73–81 (1980) (discussing the moral detachment of lawyers).
33. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 21, at 24–25.
34. See id. In an earlier time, Justice Brandeis put this idea in starker terms when he warned
that there would be “a revolt of the people against the capitalists, unless the aspirations of the people
are given some adequate legal expression.” LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in
BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 329, 339 (Hale, Cushman & Flint 1933) (1914).
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taking ownership of such activities as a central part of the profession,
might create a more likeable, less amoral portrait of lawyers, and generate increased respect for the rule of law.35
Another reason for concern about the split between doing good and
“conventional”36 practice is that, if lawyers see public interest lawyering
as marginal, such lawyers may lose sight of their moral agency. Once
they have set off, by choice or by need, in a conventional legal career,
they may believe they have left behind public interest concerns and bear
no professional obligation to consider the public interest while fulfilling
their daily responsibilities. Robert Gordon describes students who, after
abandoning ambitions of public interest careers, make the switch to pursue corporate law and “go all the way.”37 They see themselves as driven
solely by interests of clients, and are shy to consider, let alone express,
any ethical misgivings about client choices or directions from superiors.38
To be sure, thoughtful scholars can disagree about where lines
ought to be drawn in the roles of counseling or advocating for a client.
David Luban has emphasized the lawyer’s obligation to guide clients’
activities, insert oneself in decision-making, and steer clients towards
conformance with the public interest.39 William Simon argues that lawyers should maintain discretion to decline to pursue procedural or substantive arguments despite clients’ instructions to pursue them and despite the possibility of legal merit.40 Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith,
on the other hand, make compelling arguments that once a lawyer has
signed up to represent a client, it is improper to hold back any tools at her
disposal.41 The lawyer serves the public interest as a zealous advocate,
and any dereliction of that duty is the greatest failure.42 Yet Freedman
and Smith still make ethical distinctions between available legal options.
They suggest an ethical decision must be made at the moment of entering
into a retainer.43 Rather than accepting that a lawyer should represent
35. Id.
36. This Article uses Sarat and Scheingold’s definition of the term “conventional lawyering.”
See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 21, at 1–22. Conventional lawyering “involves the deployment of a set of technical skills on behalf of ends determined by the client, not the lawyer.” Id. at 2.
In contrast to cause lawyering, conventional lawyering “is neither a domain for moral or political
advocacy nor a place to express the lawyer’s beliefs about the way society should be organized,
disputes resolved, and values expressed.” Id.
37. Gordon, supra note 32, at 291–92.
38. Id.
39. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 1 (2007); DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 50–103, 174 (1988).
40. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1113–19
(1988).
41. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 79–80, 86–
87, 121–25 (2d ed. 2002).
42. Id. at 8, 13–14, 19–31, 45–49.
43. Id. at 59, 8–84; Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer’s Moral Obligation of Justification, 74
TEX. L. REV. 111, 112–13 (1995).
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anyone who comes to her door, they recognize the choice of whom to
represent as an important question.44
Regardless of their differences regarding how or when in the representation process it occurs, all of these scholars acknowledge some point
at which the individual lawyer’s ethics could restrict her advocacy. In
contrast, if Gordon is right that some law graduates believe their new
professional identity means setting aside their ethical instincts, as lawyers, these persons might become wholly unmoored from any sense of
public obligation. That possibility threatens the image and, potentially,
the legitimacy of the legal profession.45
Historically, working for the public interest has not been an afterthought, left to positions on the margins. On the contrary, serving the
public interest has been described as a founding principle of the profession.46 Talcott Parsons and sociologists following him have highlighted
the important social functions served by the legal profession.47 Roscoe
Pound famously stated that a profession is geared towards public service
by definition:
The term [profession] refers to a group of men pursuing a learned art
as a common calling in the spirit of a public service—no less a public
service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood. Pursuit
of the learned art in the spirit of a public service is the primary purpose. Gaining a livelihood is incidental, whereas in a business or
48
trade it is the entire purpose.

From this perspective, the pursuit of public service is the marker that
distinguishes a profession from a trade.49
Notably, Pound’s depiction of the professions indicates not only
that service is central, but also that “[g]aining a livelihood is incidental.”50 With regard to the legal profession in particular, this is a his44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
See Postema, supra note 32, at 73–81.
See, e.g., BRANDEIS, supra note 34, at 330.
TALCOTT PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 370, 381–85 (rev. ed. 1954) (arguing that lawyers provide a critical function
in society). For critiques of the functionalist view, see MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 167–69 (1977) (discussing lawyers’ interest in
maintaining economic power). For a critique of both Parsons’s approach and “anti-Parsonian” approaches, see Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870–1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L.
Geison ed., 1983).
48. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953) (emphasis
added).
49. Id.; see John M. Conley & Scott Baker, Fall from Grace or Business as Usual? A Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 783, 813 (2005)
(summarizing sociological debates on the significance of professions); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 592 (1985) (collecting examples of heightened rhetoric surrounding images of lawyers as professionals and not businesspersons).
50. POUND, supra note 48, at 5.
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torically accurate representation of an earlier age. When the profession
first developed in England, pecuniary gain was neither a goal nor a reality of the practice.51 Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries,
barristers were not permitted to charge fees and accepted payments only
as honoraria.52 According to Henry Drinker, barristers “regarded the law
in the same way they did a seat in Parliament—as primarily a form of
public service in which the gaining of a livelihood was but an incident.”53
Barristers came from wealthy families and did not depend on their legal
work to generate income.54 These men occupied a privileged position
that afforded them the luxury to pursue the public interest without regard
for financial support.55
Today, however, the American Bar Association boasts roughly one
and one quarter million members,56 and it would be a rare member who
could perform this role as an unpaid volunteer.57 While some attorneys
possess public service aspirations, most need and expect financial compensation for their work.58 This is relatively uncontroversial, and the
current ideals of the profession do not conflict with the desire to earn a
living.59 On the contrary, a handsome salary is commonly viewed as an

51. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210 (1953); see also Alexander Schwab, Note, In
Defense of Ambulance Chasing: A Critique of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3, 29 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 603, 606 (2011) (explaining that it was considered ungentlemanly for English barristers to be motivated by financial gain).
52. Kelly Buechler, Note, Solicitation in Class Actions: Should Class Certification Be Denied
Because Class Counsel Solicited the Class Representative?, 19 REV. LITIG. 649, 662 (2000); Katherine A. Laroe, Comment, Much Ado About Barratry: State Regulation of Attorneys’ Targeted DirectMail Solicitation, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1513, 1520 (1994).
53. DRINKER, supra note 51, at 210–11; see Buechler, supra note 52, at 662; Laroe, supra
note 52, at 1520.
54. DRINKER, supra note 51, at 210; see also Buechler, supra note 52, at 662.
55. DRINKER, supra note 51, at 210; see Schwab, supra note 51, at 606. For discussion of the
business-profession dichotomy in the early United States, see Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 386–87 (2001).
56. AM.
BAR
ASS’N,
LAWYER
DEMOGRAPHICS
(2011),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_de
mographics_2011.authcheckdam.pdf.
57. See Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant G. Garth, Pro Bono as an Elite Strategy in Early Lawyer
Careers, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 115, 115–22 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009) (suggesting that
elite lawyers at large firms promote the ideals of pro bono, can afford to engage in it, and reap its
rewards).
58. See, e.g., Conley & Baker, supra note 49, at 793–94 (citing CARROLL SERON, THE
BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM ATTORNEYS 129
(1996)) (describing study of small firm lawyers who, while struggling to earn a living, believe they
offer a public service “by making representation available and affordable to ordinary people”).
59. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(5), (6) & cmt. 8 (2012) (permitting lawyer to withdraw if client “fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding
the lawyer’s services,” “such as an agreement concerning fees,” or representation creates “unreasonable financial burden”).
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indicator of excellence, and those who reach the heights of the salary
charts generally enjoy admiration among their peers.60
Yet the expectation for public interest lawyering is that it exists outside the market for services.61 Public interest lawyering is frequently
depicted as the activity of two groups,62 for which pecuniary gain is either “incidental”63 to their work or entirely disconnected from it.64 The
first group is classic public interest lawyers who work at non-profit organizations. Although these lawyers earn income from their positions,
salaries correspond to neither hours nor case outcomes and are notoriously low.65 The second group consists of “conventional”66 attorneys who
work at for-profit firms but engage in “pro bono” work as a volunteer
activity.67 These lawyers take relatively small quantities of time from
their jobs or personal lives.68 They donate their hours to non-profit organizations or indigent persons, as if tithing or contributing a charitable
donation.69
60. See,
e.g.,
Columbia
University
School
of
Law,
PRINCETON
REV.,
http://www.princetonreview.com/schools/law/LawBasics.aspx?iid=1035777 (last visited Feb. 17,
2014) (ranking law schools according to category of “Best Career Prospects” based on “[k]ey
[s]tatistics” including “[a]verage [s]tarting [s]alary”). One set of lawyers who have attracted significant criticism related to the size of their fees is class action counsel. The particulars of class actions
are beyond the scope of this Article, but it is possible that the degree of hostility directed towards
class action counsel reflects discomfort with their hybrid public–private role. See Myriam Gilles &
Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 109–12 (2006) (describing original view of class action
lawyers as furthering public rights, and change towards criticizing the lawyers and their high fees in
the 1980s); see also id. at 162–63 (highlighting current discomfort with wealth accumulation by
plaintiffs’ class action lawyers).
61. See generally Huge Gap Remains Between Public Interest and Law Firm Attorney Salaries, NALP Reports, NAT’L JURIST (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/hugegap-remains-between-public-interest-and-law-firm-attorney-salaries-nalp-reports
(highlighting
discrepancy between public interest and law firm salaries).
62. One category of lawyers left out of the traditional public interest portrait but increasingly
recognized is lawyers employed by government entities. See, e.g., CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note
10, at 152–64; Douglas NeJaime, Cause Lawyers Inside the State, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 653
(2012); Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type . . . : Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 657 (2004).
63. POUND, supra note 48, at 4–5.
64. On the history of the split between the “distinct public interest bar” and “elite” lawyers
“who served the public only in their limited and separate pro bono efforts,” see Pearce, supra note
55, at 384, 417–20.
65. See Erichson, supra note 5, at 2106 (painting image of public interest as financially selfsacrificing); Philip G. Schrag, Why Would Anyone Want to Be a Public Interest Lawyer?, in
GEORGETOWN LAW FACULTY LECTURES AND APPEARANCES (2009), available at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fac_lectures/1/.
66. See supra note 36.
67. See Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What We Know—
and Should Know—About American Pro Bono, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 83 (2013); Scott L.
Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (2004).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2012) (setting aspiration of fifty hours of
“pro bono publico legal services per year”); R. 6.1 cmt. 9 (condoning failure to perform “hours of
service” and acknowledging financial donation as substitute).
69. See Jacobs, supra note 3, at 10 (praising “relief of those who require but cannot afford
legal services” as part of “a great tradition of American volunteerism”); Deborah M. Weissman, Law
as Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 802–08 (2002)
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In both groups, public interest lawyering is the provision of services
devalued in the market. It is legal work provided at a rate lower than the
legal professional could otherwise earn. In the first case, the legal professional accepts a salary lower than she could garner in the hiring market.70
In the latter, the work is not part of the lawyer’s primary occupation but
something in which she engages on the side. Big firms generally separate
attorneys’ pro bono lawyering from their tallies of billable hours, and the
legal services are often offered without expertise in the relevant field.71
The client in both situations pays a reduced fee, if any. Although serving
the public may have been a founding principle of the profession, public
interest lawyering has come to be understood as a deviation from the
core activity of the legal market.
II: INSTITUTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING
Part I described general perceptions of public interest lawyering,
and Part II turns to specific ways in which institutions have operationalized the concept. This Part examines: (a) tax benefits conferred on public
interest lawyering, which Congress and the Internal Revenue Service
have defined by a charitable purpose and compliance with financial and
political restrictions; (b) a public interest exception to the profession’s
prohibition on solicitation of employment, which the Supreme Court and
the American Bar Association have defined by the absence of a pecuniary motive; and (c) fee-shifting statutes, which fund public interest lawyering that serves public policies prioritized by Congress.

(describing culture of philanthropy); id. at 816 (describing critiques of volunteerism as approach to
provision of legal services).
70. Fact
vs.
Fiction:
Public
Interest
Careers,
YALE
L.
SCH.,
http://www.law.yale.edu/studentlife/cdobrochureshandouts_factvsfictionpicareers.htm (last visited
Feb. 19, 2014) (“Getting a permanent public interest job is more challenging than getting a large
firm job.”); Nita Mazumder, Myths and Realities of Pursuing Public Interest Careers, EQUAL JUST.
WORKS (Apr. 17, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/news/blog/myths-and-realities
(“Public interest jobs are often incorrectly perceived as employment options for those unable to land
a financially lucrative position.”); Debra Cassens Weiss, Unable to Find Public Interest Jobs, Some
Harvard Law Students Settle for BigLaw, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 29, 2012, 8:32 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/unable_to_find_public_interest_jobs_some_harvard_law_st
udents_settle_for_bi/ (Assistant Dean for Public Service at Harvard Law reports that in searching for
jobs students “work four times as hard to get a quarter of the money in public interest.” (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
71. See Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by Doing
Better, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357, 2395 (2010) (documenting inadequate knowledge and supervision of volunteer attorneys); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60
STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2071–72 (2008) (documenting scarcity of volunteer attorneys with relevant
skills and inefficiencies of work by inexperienced counsel); cf. Cummings & Rhode, supra, at 2429
(documenting that some firms seek to develop expertise in particular areas and channel volunteer
efforts in those directions). Note that the inexperience of volunteer attorneys is not a coincidence but
more likely the direct result of intentionally avoiding fields where the lawyers perform their “real
work” for paying clients. See infra notes 324–25 and accompanying text.
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A. Tax Benefits
The classic understanding of a “public interest law firm” is a nonprofit law firm.72 From pro bono requirements to loan assistance programs, institutions rely on non-profit status as a key indicator of public
interest lawyering.73 Before analyzing the descriptive and normative value of this nomenclature, below is a brief review of the regulatory benefits
and burdens of non-profit organizations and public interest law firms
organized as such. As described below, federal law supports the growth
of non-profit, public interest law firms but also imposes significant restrictions on their activities.
1. Tax-Exempt Non-Profits
Non-profit organizations are corporations formed for a public purpose,74 which generally enjoy special tax treatment in exchange for accepting certain limits on their activities.75 The most common non-profit
organization76 is the charitable organization, or charity, defined by Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.77 One benefit of recognition
as a 501(c)(3) organization is that the organization is exempt from paying federal income taxes.78 Arguably even more significant, donations to
a 501(c)(3) organization are deductible from the income tax calculations
of individual and corporate donors, which may encourage donations.79
To qualify as a charity under Section 501(c)(3), an organization
must meet three core requirements: it must be organized and operated
exclusively for a public purpose as defined in the statute; it must comply
with limits on handling of corporate assets; and it must comply with limits on political activities.80 So long as the organization “serves a public
72. See, e.g., CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 10, at 127; see also George Norris Stavis, Note,
Collecting Judgments in Human Rights Torts Cases—Flexibility for Non-profit Litigators?, 31
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 209, 227–30 (1999) (describing revenue limits for public interest law
firms). See generally Houck, supra note 12, at 1438–54 (describing history of public interest law
firms and non-profit status).
73.
See supra notes 3–6.
74. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1) (as amended in
2008). A non-profit organization is formed by filing bylaws or articles of incorporation with a state
agency, pursuant to corporate laws of the relevant state. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUBLICATION 557: TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 5 (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf. The non-profit corporation can then apply to the federal
government and the state for exempt status with respect to tax laws. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)1(a)(2) (as amended in 1982).
75. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(a).
76. Setting
Up
a
Nonprofit
Tax-Exempt
Corporation,
SPARC,
http://www.arl.org/sparc/publications/papers/setting_up_a_nonprofit.shtml (last visited Feb. 19,
2014). Many use the term “non-profit” to mean the 501(c)(3) charitable organization, but there are
twenty-nine different kinds of non-profits under the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. §
501(c)(1)–(29).
77. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
78. Id. § 501(a), (c).
79. Id. § 170(a)(1), (c)(2).
80. Id. § 501(c)(3). The full language of Section 501(c)(3) is as follows:
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rather than a private interest,”81 the particular purpose can be broadly
defined. Section 501(c) specifies that the non-profit corporation may be
organized and operated “for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”82 Although the IRS originally interpreted “charitable” to mean relief of the poor, it has since determined that the term “charitable” is a more general reference to any of
the listed public purposes.83
The other requirements for charities—the financial and political
limitations—are more restrictive than the public purpose requirement.
Non-profit organizations may actually earn profits in that they may earn
revenue higher than expenses, but the organizations are limited in how
they handle those funds. Assets and income may not be distributed to
individuals, except as fair compensation for services, and the organization may not be used for personal gain.84 Additionally, attempting to influence legislation, or supporting or opposing a candidate for public office, may not comprise a substantial part of a charity’s activities.85
2. Public Interest Law Firms
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recognizes the “public interest
law firm” (PILF)86 as a type of charity exempt from income taxes under
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.87 The IRS indicates that,
although the substance of PILF work need not be “unique” to the non-

List of exempt organizations. The following organizations are referred to in subsection
(a): . . . Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part
of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Id.; see also id. § 501(h) (allowing charitable organizations to spend a limited amount on lobbying,
defined in proportion to the each organization’s annual expenditures); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)1(a)(1) (as amended in 2008) (organizational and operational tests); id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2); id. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3).
81. Id. § 1.501(c)(1)-1(d)(1)(ii).
82. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a).
83. Steven D. Simpson, Tax-Exempt Organizations: Organizational and Operational Requirements, 869 TAX MGM’T PORTFOLIO at A-109 (2008).
84. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
85. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3).
86. The acronym “PILF” is used only for public interest law firms recognized as such under
federal tax law.
87. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411.
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profit sector, it must concern “issues of significant public interest.”88 The
“[c]haritable classification is based not upon the particular positions advocated, but upon the fact that legal representation is made available in
important cases where it would not be available from private firms.”89
The rationale for recognizing PILFs as charitable organizations is that,
because of their legal work, “courts and administrative agencies are afforded the opportunity to review issues of significant public interest.”90
In Revenue Procedure 92-59, the IRS sets out guidelines that PILFs
must follow in addition to the general requirements of Section
501(c)(3).91 A major focus of these guidelines is to limit the acceptance
of legal fees.92 Shortly after the IRS first recognized PILFs as charities,93
it issued guidelines forbidding such firms from accepting fees from clients94 on the basis that “charging or accepting fees from clients makes
the organization indistinguishable from a private law firm.”95 The IRS
did permit acceptance of fees if awarded by a court or administrative
agency, or if paid by an opposing party, if the PILF derived most of its
financial support from grants and contributions.96 Yet the IRS specified
that the possibility of a fee award could not be a substantial motivating
factor in the selection of cases.97 Moreover, PILFs were required to
“cease to handle issues with a strong possibility of a fee award if these
become economically feasible for private litigants.”98 The IRS revised
these guidelines in 1992 to permit PILFs to accept fees directly from
clients,99 but it imposed new requirements “to distinguish a public interest law firm’s practice from the private practice of law.”100
The current Revenue Procedure restricts PILFs’ finances in a number of significant ways. First, to maintain its charitable status, a PILF
must cover no more than fifty percent of its operating costs with attorneys’ fees.101 The organization is required to rely on donors. Under this
definition, a public interest case cannot be economically self-sufficient.
Second, fees paid by clients may not exceed the actual costs of litiga88. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Litigation by IRC 501(c)(3) Organizations, in 1984
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM TEXT (1984), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicd84.pdf, superseded in
part by Rev. Proc. 92-59.
89. Id.
90. Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152.
91. Rev. Proc. 92-59.
92. Id.
93. See Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575.
94. Rev. Proc. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 662, modified and superseded by Rev. Proc. 92-59.
95. Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 2(03) (interpreting Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154).
96. Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154.
97. Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4(03).
98. Id. § 2(04).
99. Id. § 2(05)–(06); see also COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, supra note 26, at 306–11
(noting fee restrictions adopted in 1970 and suggesting that the IRS should allow public interest
firms to accept client fees).
100. Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 2(06).
101. Id. § 4(05).
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tion.102 While costs may be charged against a retainer with any remaining
balance refunded,103 a contingency fee agreement would likely be impermissible given that a percentage of a client’s award might exceed the
actual costs incurred. This is worth noting because contingency fee
agreements are one of the market-based mechanisms by which lawyers
can earn a living while representing clients unable to pay fees with their
own financial assets.104 Third, to maintain favorable tax status, the lawyers for the PILF may not consider the likelihood or probability of a fee
when selecting cases.105 Presumably, this requirement aims to omit the
distraction of a potential for private gain so lawyers focus on their public
purpose. Finally, even if a case is of “sufficient broad public interest” to
justify representation under the organization’s mission,106 the organization may not accept any case “if the organization believes the litigants
have a sufficient commercial or financial interest in the outcome of the
litigation to justify retention of a private law firm.”107 Although the IRS
does not indicate what level of financial interest would be “sufficient . . .
to justify retention of a private law firm,” it is clear that the case must be
unattractive in the regular market for services.
3. What Public Interest Law Firms Are Not
The IRS distinguishes the PILF from legal aid and civil rights organizations.108 Legal aid and civil rights organizations gained recognition
as charitable organizations based on the definition of “charitable” under
regulations issued by the Treasury Department pursuant to Section 501
of the Internal Revenue Code.109 Treasury Regulations define “charitable” to include:
[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erection
or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening
of the burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by
102. Id. § 5(01). Additionally, a public interest law firm may not withdraw from representation
due to a client’s failure or inability to pay. Id. § 5(02).
103. Id. § 5(01).
104. In theory, a public interest law firm could draft a retainer agreement to award fees as a
percentage of winnings, with an express caveat that the amount could not exceed the costs of litigation, but this would necessarily undercut the utility of a contingency agreement. Contingency fee
arrangements are designed to reflect a lawyer’s acceptance of a risk of low or no fees. See Herbert
M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
267, 270–71 (1998). Particularly when one considers an attorney’s practice as an interrelated portfolio, the value of any one case must carry the potential to compensate for more than the costs of
litigation measured in terms of time and tangible resources expended. Another possible source of
funding could be third parties, but third parties can change the dynamics and present their own
complications. See generally Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011).
105. Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4(03).
106. Id. § 4(04).
107. Id.
108. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88.
109. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.0-1–802 (as amended in 2014).
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organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or
(i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law;
or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquen110
cy.

Legal aid organizations serving poor clients received recognition as
tax-exempt charities in 1969, based on the first clause of this provision.111 Highlighting that the Treasury Regulation had defined “charitable” to include “relief of the poor and distressed,” the IRS determined
that providing free legal services to indigent persons otherwise incapable
of obtaining such services qualified as a charitable purpose.112 Organizations providing such services therefore qualified as tax exempt.113 Ten
years later, the IRS recognized a broader exemption and included organizations that charged modest fees.114 It determined that charging an hourly
fee to clients did not negate an organization’s charitable purpose where
the fee was based on the ability to pay, not the type of services provided.115 The decision reasoned that, despite charging a modest fee, the organization still provided economic relief to the poor and distressed.116
Civil rights organizations, including those with a focus on litigation
like the ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF),117 received
recognition as charities on the basis that they “defend human and civil
rights secured by law,”118 another charitable purpose recognized by the
same Treasury Regulation.119 The IRS recognizes that human and civil
rights include not only constitutional but also statutory rights.120 Litigation to “defend . . . rights secured by law” also includes that which seeks
to broaden the definition of a legally recognized right.121
The IRS was slower to recognize PILFs as tax-exempt non-profits
than to confer this benefit on legal aid or human and civil rights organizations.122 This may be due to the definitional challenges PILFs present:
their work does not fit the traditional conception of charity.123 Legal aid

110. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2008).
111. Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1969-1 C.B. 149.
112. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id.
114. Rev. Rul. 78-428, 1978-2 C.B. 177.
115. Id.
116. Id. Note there is a difference between indigency, inability to afford representation despite
mid-level income, and lack of economic incentives to pursue legal representation. The IRS did not
recognize, or at least did not explore, these distinctions.
117. See Nicole T. Chapin, Note, Regulation of Public Interest Law Firms by the IRS and the
Bar: Making It Hard to Serve the Public Good, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 437, 442 (1993).
118. Rev. Rul. 73-285, 1973-2 C.B. 174; Rev. Rul. 68-438, 1968-2 C.B. 209.
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2008).
120. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88.
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).
122. See Houck, supra note 12, at 1446.
123. Id. at 1446–47.
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organizations represent indigent clients.124 Although the IRS does not
explicitly limit the client population served by civil and human rights
organizations, commentators have assumed that such organizations represent minorities.125 PILFs, in contrast, focus their representation on neither the poor nor minorities;126 PILFs do not limit their client base to any
particular class. A PILF may also represent a client on either side of an
issue, whereas civil or human rights organizations serve specifically to
defend civil and human rights.127 When the IRS did recognize PILFs, the
key substantive requirement imposed was simply that the cases be of
“significant public interest.”128 The definition of PILFs depended primarily on financial restrictions, not the substance of the work.129
Although both Congress and the IRS aim to support public interest
lawyering pursued by the non-profit sector, the regulation of PILFs reveals the tension between doing so and maintaining viewpoint neutrality.130 The next section of the Article addresses another area in which
legal actors struggle with the appropriate role of government in defining
public interesting lawyering: the solicitation doctrine.
B. Exception to Regulation
The regulation of solicitation provides a window into how the Supreme Court and the profession, as represented by the American Bar
Association, define public interest lawyering. Although in-person solicitation is no longer the major form by which lawyers attract new clients,131 it is one of the only areas in which the Supreme Court has offered
a detailed examination of how to distinguish public interest lawyering
124. Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1961-1 C.B. 149.
125. Rev. Rul. 73-285, 1973-2 C.B. 174. See Houck, supra note 12, at 1446 (suggesting civil
rights organizations represented minorities, while PILFs often represented “diffuse majorities”
concerned with environmental protection, consumer health, and other issues (quoting Benjamin W.
Heineman, Jr., In Pursuit of the Public Interest, 84 YALE L.J. 182, 183 (1974) (reviewing SIMON
LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. See Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411.
127. See id.
128. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88. In contrast to both PILFs and civil and human
rights organizations, legal aid organizations provide legal services in “routine personal problems”
related to family, criminal, and consumer matters. See id.
129. Rev. Proc. 92-59.
130. Coming to terms with conservative PILFs is a challenge for progressives. Oliver Houck
argued in With Charity for All, supra note 12, that foundations created and directed by business
corporations can be distinguished from PILFs because the rationale for and definition of public
interest practice is “access for unrepresented issues to the judicial system,” which the corporate
interest groups do not serve. Houck, supra note 12, at 1449. Houck makes very compelling arguments, but access is not a complete definition of and purpose for public interest lawyering, so this
distinction does not answer the question for all contexts. Part of the problem when imagining a
substantive conception of public interest lawyering is that the liberal U.S. political system seeks a
neutral government. Both to avoid viewpoint discrimination challenges and because of a genuine
belief in a particular view of the role of government, legislatures are wary of making values-based
distinctions. Yet avoiding values is constricting, if it is even possible. For a critique of the neutrality
principle in liberalism, see SANDEL, supra note 22, at 3–24.
131. Schwab, supra note 51, at 607–10 (describing decrease in solicitation).
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from the rest. As will be discussed below, the solicitation doctrine replicates the dichotomy between public interest and profit.
1. Solicitation Is Discouraged
When the legal profession first developed in England, barristers
viewed solicitation as unseemly.132 This was so, at least in part, because
barristers came from wealthy families and did not depend on income
from their work.133 They believed seeking business to be distasteful; such
activity belonged to tradesman and was unbecoming to professionals
engaged in a higher calling of public service.134
The ranks of lawyers swelled in the nineteenth century in the United
States.135 Once states expanded eligibility for practice, many chose to
pursue the profession.136 Unlike their predecessors, many of these attorneys were immigrants or persons from lower classes.137 To manage the
newcomers, states drafted codes of ethics.138 By 1908, the American Bar
Association had formed and issued the Canons of Professional Ethics,
which included a clear prohibition on solicitation of employment.139
Since its beginning, this prohibition has applied primarily to solicitation for pecuniary gain. Despite the absence of an express limitation in
the Canons, the Supreme Court interpreted this limitation to have been
assumed by the drafters.140 When the ABA issued the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1969, the Code included a broad ban on
solicitation “for compensation.”141 The first version of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct included a ban on attorney solicitation “when a
significant motive . . . is . . . pecuniary gain.”142 That language remains in
the Rule today. The current Model Rule 7.3(a) prohibits lawyers from
engaging in “in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact
solicit[ation of] professional employment from a prospective client [with

132. See DRINKER, supra note 51, at 210–11; see also Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty,
24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 72 (1935).
133. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
134. Louise L. Hill, Solicitation by Lawyers: Piercing the First Amendment Veil, 42 ME. L.
REV. 369, 377–78 (1990); Schwab, supra note 51, at 606.
135. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 40–44 (1989).
136. Louise L. Hill, A Lawyer’s Pecuniary Gain: The Enigma of Impermissible Solicitation, 5
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 396 (1991).
137. ABEL, supra note 135, at 85–90.
138. See id. at 112–13, 119, 124–25. For a discussion of the stratification of the legal profession and the use of ethics codes to limit newcomers from capturing business or sullying the professional image, see SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN
PROFESSIONS, 1750–1900, at 67–90, 206–39 (1991). See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976).
139. For literature on the class-based elements of anti-solicitation rules, particularly as applied
to personal injury lawyers, see Pearce, supra note 55, at 396–97. Whereas elite, big firm lawyers
connected with clients in country clubs, lower classes of lawyers scrambled and solicited. See id.
140. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 437 n.31 (1978) (analyzing bar opinions).
141. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-3 (1980).
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2012).

460

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:2

whom she has had no prior relationship] when a significant motive for
the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain.”143
2. Public Interest Exception
While acknowledging rationales for a prohibition on solicitation,144
the Supreme Court in 1963 recognized an exception for public interest
lawyering.145 In NAACP v. Button, the Court concluded that interference
with the NAACP’s solicitation efforts threatened the viability of litigation intended to enforce constitutional rights of racial minorities.146 The
Court ruled that a solicitation prohibition by the State of Virginia unduly
restricted the freedoms of speech and association, in violation of the First
Amendment.147 Although the Court’s opinion reflected the constitutional
claims of the underlying litigation,148 the Court emphasized the absence
of any pecuniary motive on the part of the NAACP LDF lawyers.149
To distinguish solicitation for desegregation litigation from the historically disreputable activities of champerty and maintenance,150 the
majority made a point of highlighting the relative poverty of civil rights
lawyers.151 It explained that their work generated less income than that
earned for equivalent private professional work.152 In spite of a dissent by
Justice Harlan, pointing out that, pursuant to fee-shifting statutes, the
NAACP LDF lawyers do, in fact, earn fees from desegregation litigation,153 the majority stated broadly that “[l]awsuits attacking racial discrimination, at least in Virginia, are n[ot] very profitable.”154
The Supreme Court again contrasted public interest lawyering with
profit in In re Primus155 and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n.156 Edna
143. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012).
144. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439–43 (1963).
145. Id. at 428–29, 434–36, 441–44.
146. Id. at 434–36.
147. Id. at 428–29, 444.
148. Id. at 428, 444.
149. Id. at 441–43.
150. Intervention in the lawsuit of another has always carried a negative taint, and yet, at various points in history, an exception has been recognized to serve the public interest. In Ancient
Greece, only judges, parties, and the personal supporters of parties were to be involved in trials.
Radin, supra note 132, at 48–49. Starting in the sixth century B.C., intervention on a stranger’s
behalf was permitted if the injured party could not effectively appear against a more powerful adversary. Id. at 49. Assistance for the less powerful party was understood to serve the public interest. Id.
As this practice developed in Rome, the intervenor was explicitly recognized as the representative of
the public, with his client identified as the populus Romanus. Id. at 49.
151. Button, 371 U.S. at 443–44.
152. Id. at 420–21.
153. Id. at 457 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 443 (majority opinion). Not surprisingly, the majority cited no evidence in the
record to support these conclusions. Id. This observation is not intended to minimize the impact of
boycotts and other penalties exacted on desegregation lawyers, but to demonstrate how the Court’s
decision, which made no direct reference to such context, inadvertently constructed a portrait of
public interest litigation that now threatens its financial viability. See infra Part IV.C.
155. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
156. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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Primus practiced as a member of a private, for-profit firm and served as a
paid consultant to a non-profit organization, the South Carolina Council
on Human Relations (SCCHR).157 Ms. Primus also cooperated on cases
with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on a volunteer basis
and served as an officer of the local chapter of the ACLU.158 The solicitation arose when a community member invited Ms. Primus to speak with
a group of low-income women who had been sterilized as a condition of
receiving Medicaid assistance.159 Ms. Primus met with the women and
informed them of their constitutional rights.160 She later contacted one of
the attendees, sending her a letter with an offer of free legal representation by the ACLU.161
In response, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the State of South Carolina charged Ms. Primus
with solicitation in violation of the state’s ethical canons.162 Specifically,
the Secretary claimed Ms. Primus had promoted the services of an organization whose primary purpose was the provision of legal services and
given unsolicited advice to join a prospective class action.163 The state
supreme court ordered that she receive a public reprimand.164 Ms. Primus
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled in her favor, finding
that that South Carolina had violated her First Amendment rights of expression and association.165 Making direct comparisons between the
NAACP and the ACLU,166 the Court explained that, for both organizations, litigation was “not a technique of resolving private differences.”167
Citing literature on public interest law and private attorneys-general,168
the decision emphasized the larger public purpose of the work and

157. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 414–15.
158. Id. at 414.
159. Id. at 415.
160. Id. at 416.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 417.
163. Id. at 420–21.
164. Id. at 421.
165. Id. at 439. The Court had first introduced the concept of a “right to advocate” in NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, holding that the First Amendment protected “freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.” 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958). That opinion
highlighted the “close nexus between the freedoms” of association, assembly, and speech, and emphasized that association is often necessary to realize “[e]ffective advocacy.” Id. at 460. Following
Button, the Court also extended First Amendment protection to communications in support of workers’ compensation claims, which the Court did not recognize as political, but the discussion of which
was protected as part of union members’ right of association. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v.
State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585–86 (1971); United Mineworkers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State
Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 225 (1967).
166. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427.
167. Id. at 428 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
168. Id. at 414 n.2 (citing, inter alia, Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 211–12 (1976); Comment, Private AttorneysGeneral: Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 YALE L.J. 574, 576 (1949)).
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demonstrated the Court’s developing conception of public interest lawyering.169
This portrait of public interest lawyering contrasted with working
for a fee. The Court labored over the facts to show that Ms. Primus
lacked a pecuniary motive. Rather than simply concluding that, Ms. Primus’s solicitation constituted an expression of political ideas because of
the substance of the underlying lawsuit, the Court highlighted the distance between Ms. Primus and any pecuniary gain that might result from
it.170 The Court devoted attention to the fee agreement between the
ACLU and cooperating attorneys, recognizing that the ACLU could collect fees under the governing fee-shifting statute if the organization prevailed.171 The Court determined, however, that Ms. Primus’s income did
not depend on the outcome of the litigation.172
The same day the Court ruled that Ms. Primus’s solicitation “to advance ‘beliefs and ideas’” deserved constitutional protection,173 it issued
a companion decision, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, holding that “ordinary” solicitation did not.174 Mr. Ohralik, a solo practitioner in Ohio,
solicited two clients after an uninsured driver crashed into the car in
which the clients were traveling.175 Mr. Ohralik provided the clients with
accurate advice about their legal rights and responsibilities, including
their entitlement to recover $12,500 each from an insurance company.176
Mr. Ohralik’s behavior was, however, unusually aggressive and potentially fraudulent. Mr. Ohralik solicited the clients, two 18-year-old
women, when one lay in a hospital bed and the other had returned home
from the hospital only a day earlier.177 Under such circumstances, a reasonable person might have questioned whether these individuals voluntarily elected to engage Mr. Ohralik’s services. Perhaps even more troubling, without prior permission or notice, Mr. Ohralik tape-recorded conversations with one of the clients and with the other’s parents.178 Finally,
when the clients attempted to discharge him, he insisted that the repre-

169. Id. at 437–38.
170. Id. at 428–29. As Louise Hill has observed, the Primus Court ignored how intertwined the
ACLU’s and Ms. Primus’s interests were. See Hill, supra note 136, at 404–05. All three members of
Ms. Primus’s law firm worked with the ACLU; two volunteered and one was a staff attorney. In re
Primus, 436 U.S. at 418 n.8. Ms. Primus was also engaged as a consultant by the SCCHR, the organization that invited her to speak to the potential plaintiffs. Id. at 415.
171. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 429–31.
172. Id. at 436 n.30.
173. Id. at 438 n.32.
174. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978) (quoting Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977)).
175. Id. at 449–50.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 450–51.
178. Id.
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sentation agreements were binding.179 He ultimately sued one of them for
breach of contract.180
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the
Supreme Court of Ohio found that, by engaging in solicitation, Mr.
Ohralik had violated the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility.181
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not protect
Mr. Ohralik, and, in addition to the public reprimand, his license ought to
be indefinitely suspended.182 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed.183
The Justices could have distinguished this case from In re Primus
based on the coercive and fraudulent nature of Mr. Ohralik’s conduct,184
but the majority instead focused on his profit motive.185 Mr. Ohralik offered representation in exchange for a contingency fee; he would receive
one third of any award obtained, but, if he failed to secure any relief, he
would earn nothing.186 Research demonstrates that contingency fee
agreements actually provide a method of securing legal services for persons without sufficient means to pay upfront,187 but this did not enter into
the Court’s analysis.188
The Court interpreted Mr. Ohralik’s attempt to gain “remunerative
employment” as a proposal for “a business transaction.”189 It characterized his solicitation as commercial speech comparable to advertising190
but even more dangerous because of its live, in-person format.191 The
Court had previously recognized truthful, nondeceptive advertising as
valuable for delivering information to the public and therefore entitled to
limited First Amendment protection.192 The Court recognized no special
179. Id. at 451–52.
180. Id. at 452.
181. Id. at 453–54.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 454.
184. Id. at 467–68 (describing Mr. Ohralik’s conduct as a “striking example of the potential for
overreaching that is inherent in a lawyer’s in-person solicitation”).
185. Id. at 464 (reasoning that presence of a pecuniary motive is “inherently conducive to
overreaching and other forms of misconduct”).
186. Id. at 450–51.
187. See supra note 104 (describing market role of contingency fees).
188. Indeed, the Court apparently took exception to Mr. Ohralik’s characterizing the contingency fee arrangement as one in which the client would not have to pay with her own assets. See
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467 (“He emphasized that his fee would come out of the recovery, thereby
tempting the young women with what sounded like a cost-free and therefore irresistible offer.”); id.
at 451 n.4 (“In explaining the contingent-fee arrangement, appellant told Wanda Lou that his representation would not ‘cost [her] anything’ because she would receive two-thirds of the recovery if
appellant were successful in representing her but would not ‘have to pay [him] anything’ otherwise.”
(alterations in original)).
189. Id. at 457.
190. Id. at 454.
191. The Ohralik majority distinguished Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977)
(striking down prohibition on attorney advertising), on the grounds that in-person solicitation poses
more of a danger of coercion than print advertising. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455.
192. Id. at 455–56 (discussing lower level of protection for commercial speech as defined after
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
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test for advertising by attorneys.193 In the Ohralik majority’s view, a
“lawyer’s procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only
marginally affected with First Amendment concerns. It falls within the
State’s proper sphere of economic and professional regulation.”194 The
Court drew a bright line between remunerative employment and public
interest lawyering.
Once the majority in Ohralik found that the lawyer did have a pecuniary stake in the outcome, the Court made no assessment as to the public value of the lawyer’s work. Only Justice Marshall, in his concurrence,
noted that Mr. Ohralik had in fact provided the two clients with accurate
information about their rights.195 The other Justices saw Mr. Ohralik’s
pecuniary motive as central,196 and therefore viewed the substantive value of his work as irrelevant, or else saw the public value of Mr. Ohralik’s
work as so minimal as not to deserve mention. Given the facts, it is also
possible that the Justices viewed Mr. Ohralik’s conduct as so troubling
that no degree of public value in the work could possibly justify his behavior. If so, the Court still could have distinguished the improper manner of his conduct from whether his motive was pecuniary. Yet the Justices grounded their decision in Mr. Ohralik’s apparent goal of pecuniary
gain.197 The Court stated without explanation that Mr. Ohralik not only
did not but “could not” have made an argument based on political expression or freedom of association. 198
Representing accident victims could, however, include both profitable and political components. This argument could be strong in a case
where an attorney aggregates multiple parties’ claims against large corporate defendants and alters industry practices.199 Even Mr. Ohralik accurately advised non-wealthy individuals to recover health care costs

193. Cf. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536–48 (2001) (striking down funding
conditions that prohibited lawyers from challenging welfare laws on grounds of special expressive
value of lawyers’ communications); see id. at 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of
“improper special solicitude for our own profession”); see also Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Towards an
Understanding of Litigation as Expression: Lessons from Guantánamo, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1487, 1508–12 (2011) (analyzing role of lawyers’ speech as portrayed by Velazquez majority).
194. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459.
195.
Id. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring).
196.
Id. at 464 (majority opinion) (reasoning that the presence of a pecuniary motive is “inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct” and likely to result in unacceptable
harm to the client).
197. Id. (explaining that the state necessarily has a strong interest in preventing solicitation
where there is a pecuniary motive for the purpose of protecting the public).
198. Id. at 458.
199. See Anne Bloom, Taking on Goliath: Why Personal Injury Litigation May Represent the
Future of Transnational Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL
ERA 96 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); Erichson, supra note 5, at 2093–101 (exploring motives of mass tort lawyers); id. at 2094 n.28 (collecting relevant literature on mass tort lawyers).
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from a corporate insurer; perhaps this, too, could be considered a form of
public interest lawyering.200
The Court’s jurisprudence reflects a broader ambivalence as to
whether litigation for profit can be a method of vindicating public rights,
and where public interest lawyering fits in relation to the norms of the
profession.201 As for whether the potential to earn a fee makes lawyers’
communications unworthy of protection, members of the Court have
acknowledged that earning a living is not mutually exclusive from pursuing public aims, and that the divide between professionalism and remuneration is largely an artifact of an earlier age, disconnected from “the
real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar.”202 Yet, in deciding the companion cases of Primus and Ohralik, the Court leaned
heavily on the notion that some but not all solicitation is in the public
interest, and that public interest lawyering is incongruous with the presence of any pecuniary motive.
Solicitation doctrine is an area where public interest lawyering has
been defined in opposition to that which generates a fee. The next section
of the Article will address an area that turns this model on its head.
C. Fee-Shifting Statutes
Congress has repeatedly affirmed a major category of financial support for private litigation in the public interest: fee-shifting statutes. For
certain statutes, the private enforcement of which Congress believes
serves the public interest, Congress has created judicial authority to allow prevailing plaintiffs to receive full attorneys’ fees from defendants.
It is notable that Congress chose not only to encourage potential plaintiffs to enforce these statutes, which it might have done by other
means,203 but also specifically to foster representation by skilled attorneys through financial incentives. Fee-shifting statutes therefore offer an
interesting window into which statutes and what kinds of lawyering
Congress has determined would serve the public interest, and they

200. See Susan D. Carle, Re-valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 719, 729–32, 736–37 (2001); see also Cummings, supra note 14, at 10 (defining “private
[public interest law] firms to include for-profit legal practices whose core mission is to advance a
vision of the public interest that enhances legal and political access for underrepresented groups or
pursues a social change agenda that challenges corporate or governmental power”).
201. Compare, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460 (“Lawyers have for centuries emphasized that the
promotion of justice, rather than the earning of fees, is the goal of the profession.” (quoting Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 674, 674
(1958)) (internal quotation mark omitted)), with id. at 458–59 (distinguishing public interest lawyering with political, expressive, or associational value as an exception to the mainstream of lawyers’
“remunerative employment”).
202. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977); see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460.
203. As examples of alternative approaches, a statute could sanction waiver of filing fees to
decrease barriers to litigation or expand categories of available damages to increase plaintiffs’ financial incentives.
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demonstrate the legislature’s recognition of the need to make such lawyering financially viable.
Fee-shifting contrasts with the general rule about availability of
counsel in the United States.204 The traditional rule is that each party
pays all costs of participating in any civil lawsuit, including the costs of
hiring a legal representative.205 As a corollary to that principle, if a party
cannot pay the costs of participation in a civil matter, with limited exceptions,206 there is no guarantee that the government or any private party
will cover the costs.207 Generally, if a party lacks the means to pay a lawyer, it might be unable to pursue litigation or it might be forced to do so
pro se.208 Fifty years after Gideon v. Wainwright,209 no federal constitutional decision has promised payment for legal representation in civil
matters.210
Fee-shifting statutes, however, suggest a different approach. Congress has passed extensive fee-shifting legislation that authorizes judges
in certain categories of cases to shift the cost of legal representation from
prevailing plaintiffs to the defendants against whom they have prevailed.211 Most of these statutes include the following language: a “court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”212 While the lan-

204. For a history of the American rule, see generally John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the
American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984).
205. See generally Resnik, supra note 29, at 2130–37 (introducing concept of “unaided access”
as premise of the U.S. civil justice system).
206. If indigent, a party may request a waiver of court fees.
207. As is well-known, Gideon v. Wainwright recognized a constitutional right to counsel in
criminal matters, but the same does not apply in civil proceedings. 372 U.S. 335, 339–40, 343
(1963); see Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (ruling that, even if incarceration is at
stake, there is no guaranteed right to appointed counsel in civil cases); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (denying right to appointed counsel in parental termination proceeding).
208. See Rhode, supra note 49, at 597 (highlighting that allocation of lawyers based on market
forces influences individual outcomes).
209. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
210. See Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Essential Role of the Courts in Delivering
Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 36–37 (2013) (describing civil right to counsel
movement); Earl Johnson Jr., 50 Years of Gideon, 47 Years Working Toward a ‘Civil Gideon’, 47
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 35 (2013).
211. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, app. at 44–51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting federal statutory fee-shifting provisions).
212. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012). The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of
1976 (CRAFAA) was one of the first of the modern fee-shifting provisions, and many other provisions track this language. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack
on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 1087, 1093–94 (2007). Congress passed CRAFAA in direct response to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), which
had held that courts lacked the authority to award fees to prevailing plaintiffs in the absence of a
specific statutory mandate. Albiston & Nielsen, supra at 1093–94. For further analysis of the dialogue between Congress and the Supreme Court regarding fee-shifting provisions, see generally
Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and
Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291 (1990).
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guage may appear neutral as to the identity of the prevailing party, 213 the
statutes serve to support work by lawyers striving to enforce these statutes and serve the public values behind them. The Supreme Court specifically recognized this aspect of fee-shifting statutes in a pair of cases,
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.214 and Christiansburg Garment
Co. v. EEOC,215 holding that fees are to be awarded to prevailing plaintiffs in virtually all cases,216 while prevailing defendants may be awarded
fees only in highly exceptional ones.217
Congress created fee-shifting provisions where it decided that pursuit of litigation, with the assistance of counsel, was in the public interest. Congress did not use statutory authority to restructure the civil justice system and provide fees for all prevailing plaintiffs. This approach
could have supported retention of counsel by parties with meritorious
claims and arguably increased the deterrent value of all civil laws. Yet
Congress adopted the approach of creating fee-shifting provisions only
for constitutional and statutory rights whose enforcement has special
public value.218
In fee-shifting jurisprudence, Congress and the Supreme Court have
indicated that some civil litigation has value beyond serving the substantive or procedural rights of the litigants. In those areas, Congress has
seen fit to authorize the reimbursement of attorneys pursuing the cases so
that attorneys will, in fact, pursue them.219 These statutory provisions
span areas including civil rights, workers’ rights, consumers’ rights,
freedom of information, and environmental protections, among others.220
Congress designed fee-shifting provisions as an exception to the
traditional American rule for the purpose of encouraging and sustaining
legal representation in areas that serve the public.221 It is important to
recognize that the fee-shifting provisions indicate not only that Congress
wanted aggrieved persons to pursue certain categories of cases, but also
that Congress wanted lawyers to represent the plaintiffs in those cases.
The fee-shifting provision does not provide an additional reward to plaintiffs who pursue claims; it rewards only those plaintiffs who secure representation. In theory, Congress could have created a new category of
213. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 3–4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5910–11 (1976).
214. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
215. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
216. See Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
217. Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421.
218. S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 4–5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912 (explaining the
intent behind the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976); see also W. Va. Univ. Hosps.,
Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 108–11 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (summarizing legislative history).
219. See, e.g., Newman, 390 U.S. at 402; Brand, supra note 212, at 309–10.
220. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, app. at 43–51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(collecting federal statutory fee-shifting provisions).
221. See infra notes 286–93 and accompanying text.
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compensatory damages awarded to successful plaintiffs, but instead
Congress provided an award for the lawyers who take those cases. Congress determined that parties would be unable to assess the merits of their
cases or litigate them effectively without representation.222 Particularly
given the absence of a civil Gideon, fee-shifting statutes represent a
strong statement as to which lawyering activities serve the public interest.
III. COMPARING THREE APPROACHES
The previous section surveyed three very different institutional contexts in which public interest lawyering is operationalized: tax exemptions, exceptions to the solicitation prohibition, and fee-shifting statutes.
This section will compare and analyze the definitions constructed in the
three contexts.
A. Fee-Shifting Legislation as a Counter-Example
In its solicitation jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between litigation aimed at public purposes and litigation motivated by pecuniary gain.223 The Court has recognized public interest litigation, in contrast to commercial lawyering, as an extension of political
expression entitled to the highest level of First Amendment protection. In
the companion cases of In re Primus and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass’n, the Court protected the solicitation of an attorney volunteering
with the ACLU on a potential substantive due process case, while upholding censure of an attorney who engaged in solicitation of personal
injury cases for a contingency fee.224 In addition to the substantive differences distinguishing the underlying litigation, the majority opinion in
each case devoted significant attention to the role of the soliciting attorneys’ pecuniary gain. Particularly in Ohralik, although the concurrence
pointed out that Mr. Ohralik had, in fact, provided accurate and potentially useful legal advice, the majority failed to consider seriously the extent
to which Mr. Ohralik’s lawyering activities served a public purpose.225
The majority determined that the attorney’s motives were pecuniary in
nature and resolved the case on that basis.226 This binary approach has
since dominated solicitation doctrine jurisprudence227 and shaped the
222. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 3–4, 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910–11, 5913. Congress wanted to attract counsel who could handle sophisticated cases and recognized that fees needed
be set accordingly. See id. at 6 (fees should be set at an amount that would “attract competent counsel”).
223. See supra Part II.B.
224. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 447–48 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 412–13 (1978). For literature on the class-based elements of anti-solicitation rules, particularly
as applied to personal injury lawyers, see Pearce, supra note 55, at 396–97.
225. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 473–74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
226. See id. at 467 (majority opinion).
227. Note that there has been some ambivalence on the Court. In one of its advertising cases,
the Court noted that law is no less a profession because lawyers “earn their livelihood at the bar.”
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public interest exception to the Model Rule, which bars solicitation of
employment “when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the
lawyer’s pecuniary gain.”228
The IRS recognizes a broad category of lawyering as public interest
work deserving of tax benefits.229 Treasury Regulations specify that to
qualify, the lawyering work must serve a public rather than private interest.230 One form of activity that tax law recognizes is legal services for
indigent clients, provided at a reduced fee based on the indigent clients’
ability to pay, rather than at a market rate based on the type of service.
This category qualifies because it is considered a form of charity to the
poor, which necessarily serves the public, as opposed to a private interest.231 The IRS has interpreted public interest lawyering deserving of tax
benefits to include organizations that defend human or civil rights, even
if their clients are not indigent persons.232 To qualify for tax exemption, a
human or civil rights organization must comply with the asset restrictions
of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.233 The IRS will also
engage in special scrutiny of whether a human or civil rights organization engaged in litigation serves a public, as opposed to private, interest.
If client fees provide a primary form of financial support for the organization, that fact can indicate that the organization services a private rather than public purpose.234 Finally, another form of activity that the tax
law recognizes is that of a “public interest law firm” (PILF) that complies with the particular requirements of Revenue Procedure 92-59.235 In
that case, even if a law firm neither serves indigent clients nor defends
human or civil rights, the IRS may recognize the law firm as engaged in
a unique category of public interest law if it serves the “public rather
than a private interest” and handles “issues of significant public interest.”236 To distinguish these PILF cases from “traditional private law,”
the IRS has issued guidelines restricting the finances of PILF firms.237
Although such cases may generate attorneys’ fees, to qualify as “public
interest law” for tax exemption purposes,238 the fee for those cases must
be severely limited.239 Most importantly, the fee must be small enough to
make the case “not . . . economically feasible for the traditional private
law firms,” and the fees must add up to less than fifty percent of the
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977). Perhaps there is acceptance of the notion that
the profession must earn a living, but public interest work is still held out as special.
228. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012).
229. See supra Part II.A.
230. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
231. Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1969-1 C.B. 149.
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2); Rev. Rul. 73-285, 1973-2 C.B. 174.
233. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4).
234. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).
235. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411.
236. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88; Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 3(01).
237. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88; Rev. Proc. 92-59 §§ 3–5.
238. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88; Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4.
239. Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4(03)–(05).
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overall costs of operating the lawyer’s firm.240 In all three of these areas
recognized for tax benefits—legal aid to the poor, defending human and
civil rights, and public interest law more broadly conceived—the IRS
tethers its definition of the category of public interest law to the economics of the legal services. In the first category, the economics of the client
population are the defining factor. In the remaining two, the work is demarcated by exceptional fee structures and market conditions.
Fee-shifting statutes stand in stark contrast to the approaches to
public interest lawyering taken in the contexts of tax benefits and solicitation. Although Congress has not expressly crafted one statute defining
all public interest litigation in which fee shifting is to be available, in a
series of subject-specific laws, it has carved out a major exception to the
traditional American rule regarding the availability of civil counsel, and
legislative history makes clear that the purpose of this exception is to
encourage litigation in the public interest.241 The subjects of this public
interest litigation have historically focused on civil rights but, for the past
half century, they have expanded into other areas including labor, consumer protection, securities, the environment, and public access to government records.242
There are two key differences between the concept of public interest
lawyering as expressed in fee-shifting statutes, on the one hand, and in
solicitation rules and tax exemptions, on the other. First, fee-shifting
statutes define public interest lawyering based on the substance of the
work. This definition does not depend primarily on the unavailability of
representation in the current legal services market. Rather, because the
lawyering addresses topics of particular public interest, the statutes seek
to facilitate it within, and build on, the existing economic market. This is
not to say that the creation of fee-shifting statutes is unrelated to market
conditions and market failures. The fee-shifting provisions would not be
necessary if all potential plaintiffs with claims had both the means and
the incentives to pay market-rate attorneys’ fees.243 Yet what is notable is
that the definition of which kind of lawyering work is worth supporting

240. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 88; Rev. Proc. 92-59 §§ 2(02), 4(04)–(05).
241. See supra Part II.C.
242. Although the collection of statutes carrying such provisions may be recognizable as public
laws, as a historical matter, the group does not necessarily reflect one unified scheme for public
interest lawyering so much as the priorities of legislators at various times in U.S. history.
243. Although the statutes were passed with the assumption that potential litigants could not
afford to pay attorneys’ fees, not all fee-shifting statutes were based on evidence of that empirical
reality. Moreover, some of the statutes aim to remedy social problems that even wealthy individuals
or a collection of such individuals would not have sufficient economic incentive to pursue. Even to
assess whether potential clients could afford the litigation in the current market makes little sense,
where the case is too expensive for anyone’s private interests to make it worthwhile and yet it is
highly worthwhile given the larger public interest. See, e.g., Chapin, supra note 117, at 442–43
(characterizing PILF cases as those on behalf of a non-indigent majority lacking economic incentive
to sue).
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is a positive one, based on the substance of the cases, as opposed to a
negative one, based on the market’s devaluation of the work.244
There is a second unique attribute of the fee-shifting statutes as a
definition of public interest lawyering. Unlike solicitation jurisprudence,
which focuses on pecuniary motives, and tax law, which distinguishes
between organizational purposes, fee-shifting provisions do not consider
good intentions. Fee-shifting statutes recognize and reward only that
activity which, through a court order or settlement, brings results. Under
the Model Rule and jurisprudence on which it is based, public interest
lawyering without pecuniary intent will be granted an automatic exception to the general prohibition on solicitation.245 It does not matter
whether or not that lawyer accomplishes anything for a client. The same
is true for public interest lawyering under federal tax law. A non-profit
law firm will enjoy tax benefits so long as it complies with federal tax
law requirements, regardless of the actual utility of the services it offers.
Yet, to enjoy the benefits of fee-shifting provisions, a lawyer must not
only engage in work whose subject matter is defined by statute, but she
must prevail.246 She must not only intend to do good, but also she must
actually accomplish something for her clients.247
B. Solicitation Rules and Tax-Exempt Non-Profits
The rationale behind the solicitation prohibition might lend itself to
a public interest exception defined by pecuniary motive. Bar associations
and courts have advanced a number of slightly different rationales for the
general rule. These rationales can be divided into three categories.
244. The financial means of the clients is not totally irrelevant, because if the clients could
afford to pay lawyers out of pocket, arguably the fee-shifting statutes would not be necessary. But
the reason for the fee-shifting statutes goes beyond obtaining lawyers for individual clients without
means to pay; it stems from a sense that the litigation serves a larger public purpose. It serves to
enforce laws whose public policies are of particular value and to deter bad actors who would violate
those laws in the future. The fee-shifting provisions serve not only to assist the individual with
securing access to legal services but, even more, to promote certain kinds of lawyering in the public
interest. Unlike in legal services, the class status of the clients is not among the key factors in determining whether the representation should be provided as a form of public service lawyering. On the
contrary, the class status of the clients varies widely across fee-shifting statutes, from securities cases
to consumer cases to employment discrimination cases, many of which involve persons of means but
without sufficient economic incentives to engage a lawyer’s services, given the likely damages. But,
again, a major purpose of these statutes and the enforcement of them is deterrence, and, for that, the
class status of the individual plaintiffs is irrelevant.
245. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012); see also infra notes 248–56 and
accompanying text.
246. The fee-shifting approach also carries special vulnerabilities and challenges. See infra Part
IV.
247. It should be noted that some critics believe the lawyer can obtain fees even if the result
offers relatively little value for her client. Compare Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734–35 (1986)
(describing relatively high fees despite relatively low monetary damages), with Danya Shocair Reda,
The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV.
1085, 1117–18 (2012) (describing image of overpaid lawyers as inaccurate). Yet, in theory, successful litigation pursuant to a fee-shifting statute benefits not only the individual client, but also the
public at large, see Evans, 475 U.S. at 752 (Brennan, J., dissenting), so the estimated value of the
legal services should incorporate the broader benefit.
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First, solicitation of clients for the lawyer’s own employment arguably creates an inherent conflict of interest.248 When a lawyer communicates with a layperson about the viability of any potential claims or defenses, and the prudence of retaining counsel, the person looks to the
lawyer for advice. However, when that lawyer hopes to enter into a retainer with a client, the lawyer cannot provide unbiased advice.
Second, solicitation could result in a retainer when the client does
not truly want representation. This is the greatest risk in the case of coercion or fraud by the attorney. Even in the absence of behavior that qualifies as fraud or coercion, courts have issued warnings about the consequences of lawyers, “trained in the art of persuasion,” interacting with
laypersons.249
Third, solicitation could result in a retainer where the client does not
need, or would not benefit from, representation. Like the second rationale, this is a concern where the attorney engages in fraud or coercion,
or the layperson is fragile or incapable of assessing her own interests.
But the concern here is substantive: preventing solicitation where entering into the retainer is not in the person’s best interests.250
To the extent that solicitation prohibitions aim to avoid conflicted or
otherwise bad behavior by attorneys, it could seem that a public interest
exception based on pecuniary motives makes sense. One rationale for the
pecuniary motive limitation is the idea that a lawyer with a pecuniary
motive will necessarily have a conflict of interest when advising a potential client, because of the lawyer’s desire to enter into the retainer and
earn a fee.251 If the lawyer bears no financial incentive to convince the
248. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 461 n.19 (1978); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmts. 1–3 (2012).
249. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464–66; see also Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 96–103 (2d Cir.
2010) (upholding moratorium on post-accident targeted solicitation regardless of actual fraud or
coercion); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmts. 2–3 (2012). Regulators and courts
generally view in-person solicitation as particularly likely to risk harm to potential clients. Compared
with recordings, mailings, and general advertisements, in-person solicitation may allow less time for
a layperson to make a decision about entering into a retainer, and she may feel pressured by the
presence of an attorney while deciding. See id. In Ohralik, the Court suggested that in-person solicitation presents special dangers of pressuring potential clients to respond quickly and affirmatively to
offers of representation, which might be easier to ignore if presented in printed form. Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 457. Additionally, in-person communications may be the most difficult to monitor and to
challenge. The content of a written or recorded form of solicitation can more easily be established.
Finally, as courts and regulators have loosened restrictions on advertising and non-live forms of
solicitation, these alternative avenues of communication may be cited to show a decreased need for
in-person solicitation and therefore decreased acceptance of the risks in-person solicitation entails.
250. Another, less emphasized, concern may be that retainers entered into under conditions of
in-person solicitation are particularly likely to be gateways to other substantive problems, such as the
provision of substandard services. One might believe that in-person solicitation agreements tend to
be formed between unscrupulous lawyers and particularly vulnerable populations that lack recourse
if the lawyer fails to perform well. If that were the case, regulators might determine that the regulation of the quality of services is too expensive and too intrusive to pursue as thoroughly as would be
necessary to stamp out all such incidents of inadequate legal representation, but stopping the formation of such relationships before they occur is a productive approach.
251. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmts. 2, 5 (2012).
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target of the solicitation to become a client, the conflict might disappear.252
Lawyers motivated by pecuniary gain might also be more likely to
engage in the types of abusive practices that solicitation restrictions are
designed to prevent. Comment 5 to the Model Rule says exactly this:
“There is far less likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices . . . in situations in which the lawyer is motivated by considerations
other than the lawyer’s pecuniary gain.”253 The drafters of the comment
posit that if an attorney’s primary motivation is something other than
profit, she will be less likely to behave badly.254 They suggest that pecuniary gain is the bad motive most likely to cloud a lawyer’s judgment.255
The construction of this rule reflects a progressive idea that, so long as an
expert was removed from economic interest, “his commitment to the
common good [would be] pure and incorruptible.”256
Yet, following this logic, the pecuniary motive approach to the public interest exception can be both overinclusive and underinclusive. The
exception may be too broad, permitting solicitation in situations where
the absence of pecuniary gain does not provide a sufficient guarantee of
good behavior. Monetary greed is not the only motivator that can lead to
bad behavior or conflicts of interest. Take the case of Ms. Primus: while
she might have wanted to help the women she met, she also wanted to
participate in crafting litigation to challenge the imposition of sterilization requirements. This might be a motivation separate from pecuniary
gain, and it might benefit the public at large, but it could be different
from the needs of the potential clients. Scholars have previously written
about the conflicts public interest lawyers may face when representing a
cause and not just a client.257 While the lawyer may have multiple goals
and the majority of those may be pure in the sense of not being monetarily self-interested, this does not necessarily safeguard the goodness of the
solicitation with respect to potential conflicts.
If the goal of the public interest exception is to make room for solicitation that serves the public interest, the pecuniary gain exception is also
potentially too narrow.258 First, an attorney could possess mixed motives,
seeking to promote the public interest and to earn a living. Her motives
could change over time; for example, an attorney might come to believe
strongly in the public value of a case that she previously accepted only
252. Id. at cmt. 5.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 105
YALE L.J. 1445, 1467 (1996); see Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early
NAACP (1910–1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 144 & n.162 (2002).
257. See Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 548, 555 (2004).
258. See Hill, supra note 136, at 393–94.
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for monetary reasons. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow has discussed with
respect to cause lawyers, parsing or quantifying motives may be impossible.259 Second, and perhaps more importantly, an actor’s conduct may
be good or bad regardless of intent.260 The lawyer might have pecuniary
or other “bad” motives and the legal services could still be good.261 The
reverse is also true. In both cases, the motive of the attorney can be unrelated to whether the solicitation serves the public interest.
Aside from the specific rationales behind the solicitation rules, the
other factor influencing the solicitation doctrine is the role of the First
Amendment. The solicitation cases may have framed public interest in
opposition to pecuniary motives due to what the Court perceived as a
dichotomy between political and commercial forms of speech. The Court
framed Primus and Ohralik as follows:
Unlike the situation in Ohralik, however, appellant’s act of solicitation took the form of a letter to a woman with whom appellant had
discussed the possibility of seeking redress for an allegedly unconstitutional sterilization. This was not in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. Appellant was communicating an offer of free assistance by
attorneys associated with the ACLU, not an offer predicated on entitlement to a share of any monetary recovery. And her actions were
undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to advance the
civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial
gain. The question presented in this case is whether, in light of the
values protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, these differences materially affect the scope of state regulation of the conduct
262
of lawyers.

The status of the commercial speech doctrine at the time of the decisions may partly explain this approach.263 It was shortly before the de259. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding
of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 10,
at 31, 37–48.
260. A separate question, beyond the scope of this paper, is whether bad acts may be justified if
they serve a greater good. In the case of an attorney engaged in solicitation, the solicitation might be
conducted poorly, even coercively, for the purpose of serving a greater good. If an individual plaintiff were enlisted by the NAACP LDF under circumstances we might view as pressured, but the
organization represented her zealously and it won both a judgment for her and a victory for racial
equality, we might have different views as to whether this solicitation should be punished.
261. See, e.g., Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2212–13 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting that lawyers were prohibited from using the Freedom of Information Act to obtain public
information to locate additional plaintiffs for ongoing suit, even though statute allows provision of
information for litigation or “investigation in anticipation of litigation” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also infra notes 304–08 and accompanying text (describing important public interest
served by some lawyering by large, conventional law firms).
262. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
263. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622–24, 635 (1995) (interpreting attorney
advertisements as commercial speech subject to intermediate scrutiny pursuant to Central Hudson
and holding that restriction on targeted mail advertisements withstood intermediate scrutiny); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–66 (1980) (identifying
test for commercial speech); see also Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 473–77, 479–80
(1988) (striking down restriction on targeted mailings); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
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cisions of Primus and Ohralik that the Court issued Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,264 recognizing
limited First Amendment protection for commercial speech.265 In
Ohralik, the Court explained that commercial speech merits only “a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in
the scale of First Amendment values . . . allowing modes of regulation
that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.”266 The Court has since broadened the protections for commercial
speech, but the notion has persisted that public interest lawyering is disconnected from the commercial market.267 The drafters of the Model
Rules continue to use the absence of a significant pecuniary motive as
the key indicator of public interest lawyering excluded from the solicitation prohibition.268
Lawyers employed by non-profit organizations are understood to be
exempted from solicitation prohibitions, though Supreme Court jurisprudence does not require the exemption to reach so broadly.269 Comment 5
to the Model Rule explains that the solicitation prohibition “is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from participating in constitutionally protected activities of public or charitable legal-service organizations.”270
Courts tend to view solicitation by non-profits as excluded under a blanket rule, without separate analyses of the attorneys’ motivations or
whether the activity is entitled to constitutional protection.271 Although
the structure of a non-profit means the lawyer will not receive a profit
directly from the case, should litigation lead to fees pursuant to a feeshifting statute, the fees could increase the size of the organization’s war
471 U.S. 626, 647, 649 (1985) (reversing discipline against attorney for truthful and not misleading
statements in advertising).
264. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
265. Id. at 770.
266. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
267. The Court specifically applied First Amendment protections to attorney advertising in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, “holding that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket
suppression . . . [but] not . . . that advertising by attorneys may not be regulated in any way.” 433
U.S. 350, 383 (1977). It encouraged the bar to “assur[e] that advertising by attorneys flows both
freely and cleanly.” Id. at 384.
268. See supra Part II.B. The drafters of the Model Rules are of course free to recognize and
exempt a category of public interest lawyering broader than the category of public interest lawyering
determined to be constitutionally protected.
269. Compare Rivera v. Brickman Grp., Ltd., No. 05-1518, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10210, at
*5–6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2006) (finding that, given non-profit status of law firm, there was no evidence that plaintiffs’ counsel was motivated by pecuniary gain, even though attorneys sought fees
provided by statute), with McKenna v. Champion Int’l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1215 n.5 (8th Cir.
1984), abrogated on other grounds by Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989)
(distinguishing employment case in which class was represented by “a private attorney who is requesting a court-awarded fee” from Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), where class was
represented by the NAACP LDF, a “nonprofit organization formed to litigate civil-rights cases”).
270. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 5 (2012).
271. See, e.g., Rivera, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10210, at *5–6 (“If, like most non-profit organizations, plaintiffs’ counsel’s employer uses income to fund more projects rather than supplement the
salaries of its employees, one can expect plaintiffs’ counsel to receive no pecuniary gain whatsoever
from their efforts in this litigation.”).
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chest or even determine its overall financial health. Additionally, since
attorneys’ careers can crisscross between for-profit firms, government
agencies, and non-profit organizations, an individual attorney could have
a pecuniary motive in pursuing a case in any one of these settings. If a
case might increase the lawyer’s legal skill or reputation, it could very
well lead, albeit indirectly, to pecuniary gain down the road.272
Putting aside motives, it still is not obvious why solicitation for every kind of case handled by a charitable legal-services organization would
be constitutionally protected. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence indicated that solicitation for law reform cases involved rights of free expression and association,273 but the First Amendment might not protect runof-the-mill legal services cases. Explaining the special democratic role of
the litigation on behalf of minorities,274 the Court emphasized that the
NAACP did not take on “ordinary damages actions [or] criminal actions
in which the defendant raises no question of possible racial discrimination.”275 In Primus, the Court highlighted that “the ACLU has only entered cases in which substantial civil liberties questions are involved.”276
It is not clear that the Court intended for solicitation of all charitable legal organizations to be constitutionally protected.277
Why, then, is all non-profit lawyering treated as exempt from solicitation rules? Most likely, bar associations and courts view charitable
organizations as providing access to legal services for low-income populations, and they recognize solicitation as a means of improving that access. This access-based definition of public interest lawyering recognizes
an exception to the regulation for lawyering that serves otherwise neglected segments of society. The approach of the American Bar Association, in facilitating solicitation by non-profits, offers special regulatory
privileges for legal services that compensate for market failures, just as
the Court’s solicitation jurisprudence reflected special appreciation for
legal services that compensate for failures of the political system.
The access-based approach to public interest lawyering stands in
contrast to the approach implicit in fee-shifting statutes. Such laws incorporate substantive decisions as to which cases serve the public, and
implement those decisions by making use of market mechanisms. Unlike
actors that identify public interest lawyering as lawyering in absence of
profit or fees, Congress has, in fee-shifting statutes, identified substantive
272. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 259, at 41.
273. See generally Sabbeth, supra note 193 (analyzing theory of political expression suggested
in solicitation cases).
274. The Court emphasized that litigation expressing the views of minorities and minority
interests has special importance in a political system where such views might not find other avenues
of expression. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430–31 (1963).
275. Id.
276. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 427 (1978) (quoting In re Smith, 233 S.E.2d 301, 303 (S.C.
1977), rev’d, Primus, 436 U.S. 412) (internal quotation marks omitted).
277. See generally id.; Button, 371 U.S. 415.
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categories of public interest lawyering, and implemented measures to
make it profitable precisely because of its public value.
C. Tax Benefits and Fee Shifting
Both fee-shifting statutes and tax law involve private actors supporting public interest lawyering, yet they do so in different ways. Feeshifting statutes encourage public interest litigation and put the cost on
the bad actors whose behavior creates the need for it. The legislature
defines which litigation is in the public interest and mandates that bad
actors pay the costs of the litigation brought against them. Tax benefits,
on the other hand, serve as a financial subsidy from the federal government to private actors, who in turn provide a service in the public interest. An important critique of relying on the non-profit sector is the unaccountability of the private provider.278 The tax benefit model allows unelected, wealthy funders of the non-profits to define the public interest and
set the priorities for funding. In contrast, in fee-shifting statutes, the federal government maintains responsibility for setting priorities and defining the public interest.
In fee-shifting statutes, Congress makes a substantive determination
that certain lawyering activity is in the public interest, while, in the context of tax benefits, the IRS defines public interest lawyering based primarily on finances and leaves the substantive decisions to the donors. An
organization may qualify as a charity for tax purposes based on the finances of the client population, in the case of legal aid organizations
serving the indigent, or asset restrictions and fee restrictions in the case
of civil and human rights organizations or PILFs. The IRS does maintain
some control over what counts as public interest lawyering by defining
the public purposes that qualify an organization for 501(c)(3) status, but
those purposes have been so broadly interpreted that it is difficult to
identify a clear set of priorities. Moreover, the IRS has specified that, in
the case of the PILF, it is the fee restrictions that distinguish it.279 Although the definition of charitable purposes necessarily reflects some
value judgments,280 the federal government has attempted to create the
278. See Garry W. Jenkins, Nongovernmental Organizations and the Forces Against Them:
Lessons of the Anti-NGO Movement, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 459, 510 (2012) (“The notion that nonprofits need to improve their levels of accountability is conventional wisdom among students of civil
society and philanthropy.”); Penina Kessler Lieber, 1601–2001: An Anniversary of Note, 62 U. PITT.
L. REV. 731, 736 (2001) (describing “unbridled power and potential for abuse” of private foundations); Weissman, supra note 69, at 803 (“Philanthropies engage in the social issues of their choosing, without accountability to political processes, yet often perform government functions and influence state power.”).
279. See Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411.
280. See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 533 (1959); Slee v. Comm’r, 42
F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Resnik, supra note 29, at 2128–29 (describing how judges
have attempted to rely on market indicators of the value of lawyers’ work to avoid making their own
assessments of the utility of certain forms of litigation, but arguing that, in issuing opinions on fees,
judges do in fact make value judgments, and it is “irresponsible not to talk openly about how judges
should spend money in pursuit of social goals achieved through litigation”).
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appearance of neutrality281 while recognizing activities worthy of tax
benefits.
The key theoretical bases for granting tax benefits to charitable organizations and their donors can be summarized in three categories: (1)
charitable donations relieve pressure on the government by offering services that the government would otherwise be obligated to provide or
could face political costs for failure to provide, such as shelter for the
homeless;282 (2) charity creates positive externalities beyond redistribution of resources or the provision of services, such as encouraging civic
engagement and educating the public on policy matters;283 and (3) taxing
charities may be practically impossible.284
In the case of non-profits engaged in public interest lawyering, tax
benefits allow the government to support private actors engaged in activities that the government could not engage in directly. For example,
through tax benefits, the federal government facilitates the work of the
ACLU or the NAACP LDF, and much of that work is to challenge government action. Of course the government could not actually appear in
litigation as its own adversary, but through the tax benefits, the government helps to fund its own opposition. The rationale for doing so is, at
least in part, the public interest in a vibrant, democratic dialogue.285
281. The political neutrality of the federal government is questionable. Critics on the right
would point to recent audits of Tea Party organizations, while critics on the left have described
historical persecution of the NAACP and other progressive organizations. See, e.g., CHEN &
CUMMINGS, supra note 10, at 36.
282. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008) (defining charitable organizations as organizations that “lessen[] . . . the burdens of [g]overnment”); see also McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972) (“The rationale for allowing the deduction of charitable
contributions has historically been that by doing so, the [g]overnment relieves itself of the burden of
meeting public needs which in the absence of charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the
[g]overnment.”). One theoretical justification for granting tax benefits to non-profits is that to offer
the tax benefits costs less than to provide the services directly. See Paul Valentine, A Lay Word for a
Legal Term: How the Popular Definition of Charity Has Muddled the Perception of the Charitable
Deduction, 89 NEB. L. REV. 997, 1009–10 (2011); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 590 (1983) (“The exemption from taxation of money and property devoted to charitable
and other purposes is based on the theory that the [g]overnment is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations
from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.” (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
283. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax Subsidies,
91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 610 (2011); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 430
(1998); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 404–05 (1998) (discussing the view
that tax deductions give donors the ability to influence government support).
284. Some of the most common practical objections to taxing non-profits are: taxes could
threaten the viability of non-profit organizations, while generating relatively little income for public
coffers; identifying taxable income of non-profits creates definitional puzzles; and exemptions for
religious non-profits are needed to preserve the separation of church and state. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer,
The “Independent” Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits of Autonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV.
51, 64–65 (2012); Robert Christopherson & James J. Coffey, Hedging Property Taxes for Exempt
Organizations, 34 TAX’N EXEMPTS 39, 40–42 (2012). See generally Diane L. Fahey, Taxing Nonprofits out of Business, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547 (2005).
285. See Sabbeth, supra note 193, at 1499–502, 1530–31 (discussing importance of dissent).
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The rationale for fee-shifting statutes is similar to that of tax benefits for non-profits in that it creates an incentive for private actors to engage in public interest lawyering that exceeds what the government can
afford to fund. As the Senate Report concerning the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of 1976 (CAFAA or the Fee Act)286 indicated,
“[a]ll of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement,
and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to
have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional
policies which these laws contain.”287 The legislature designed feeshifting statutes to support the “private attorney general”288 who enforces
public policy.289
One difference between the public interest lawyering supported by
fee-shifting statutes and that supported by tax benefits is that the former
serves as a deterrent to the behavior of identified bad actors, while the
latter provides a universal open invitation to do good. The Senate Report
for CAFAA highlighted not only representation of victims of civil rights
violations, but also prosecution of the violators: “If private citizens are to
be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation[]’s
fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must
have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these
rights in court.”290 The fee-shifting statutes function not only as carrots
but also as sticks; they encourage public interest lawyering, but also
mandate that bad actors will be required to cover the costs of it when
necessary to bring them into compliance with the law. Tax law portrays
public interest lawyering as a politically neutral activity, to be funded by
private parties inclined by generosity. Fee-shifting statutes, in contrast,
elevate public interest lawyering to an essential activity, whose funding,
though covered by private actors, is mandatory.291
A second difference between the incentives in fee-shifting statutes
and tax benefits is worth noting. Fee-shifting is tied to prevailing in individual cases, while tax subsidies are based on an organization’s overall
286. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012). The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of 1976 was
one of the first of the modern statutory provisions, and most other provisions use it as a model.
287. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910 (1976).
288. Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2133–37 (2004) (describing the growth of the concept of the private attorney general).
289. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. Notably, the Senate Report
described civil rights victims, the potential plaintiffs, as private attorney generals, but their lawyers
are the better private analogue to the attorney general, and, as is discussed in Part II.C of this Article,
it is clear that it is the lawyers at whom the legislation was aimed.
290. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
291. Of course, to the extent the tax benefits support litigation, there is a less explicit adversary. For example, if there were no subsidy for the ACLU, that would weaken, if not destroy, the
ACLU, and violators of the constitutional rights defended by the ACLU might be able to more freely
engage in unconstitutional behavior in the absence of any lawyers to challenge their acts. The same
is true for legal aid organizations that, for example, represent poor tenants and make it harder for
private or public landlords to violate housing laws.
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activities. Tax law recognizes charitable organizations engaged in nonlitigation activities and imposes special restrictions on charities engaged
in litigation. Fee shifting, in contrast, is available only for litigation and,
as discussed above, only that in which one prevails.292
Both of these contexts reflect fundamental conceptions of what public interest lawyering is and should be. Tax law depicts public interest
lawyering as an individual choice, a voluntary act of charity and good
will. Fee-shifting statutes, on the other hand, embrace a vision of public
interest lawyering grounded in democratically defined values and a social mandate to enforce them.293
IV. COMPLICATING THE DIVISION BETWEEN PUBLIC INTEREST
LAWYERING AND PROFIT
The ambiguity about where financial gain fits in the definition of
public interest lawyering may reflect a broader ambivalence about the
identity of the legal profession. We may be confused or conflicted about
how earning an income fits with the view of ourselves as enlightened
professionals serving the public. If all lawyering helps to ensure that social problems are resolved within the rule of law and all lawyering protects the interests of some members of the public, then perhaps all lawyering is in the public interest. Yet we tend to believe that there is a subset of lawyering activity for which the term public interest lawyering is
reserved. The term is typically used as shorthand for volunteer activities
outside of a lawyer’s regular practice or the activities of a small subset of
lawyers who have selflessly committed themselves, at least temporarily,
to a life different from the mainstream of practice; in many cases, they
have taken vows of relative poverty and sacrificed the usual rewards of
the profession. Yet this approach is both descriptively incomplete and
potentially dangerous.
When legal actors are in the position to make choices about regulation, funding, or less tangible forms of support, they ought not to mistake
undercompensation for the only indicia of public interest lawyering. Rather, they must engage in constructing a substantive definition fitting the
specific institutional context and the legal actors’ priorities. There are
two reasons why this is important. First, there are lawyering activities
that serve important public functions, regardless of whether they generate
income. Second, to the extent that there are public values worth protect292. See supra Part III.A.
293. Fee-shifting statutes do not require government expenditures (unless a government entity
is liable as a defendant), but tax benefits cost the federal government millions of dollars per year. See
S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 3–4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (highlighting the advantage of feeshifting, rather than the creation of more government “bureaucracy” for enforcement, in terms of
both revenue and political philosophy). Tax laws reflect value judgments, but they also maintain the
appearance of substantive neutrality. Perhaps it would be difficult to make a substantive judgment,
like that in the fee-shifting statutes, in combination with a significant allocation of resources, like
that in the tax laws, without generating significant controversy.
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ing, it is critical that protection efforts are strong and financially independent. Otherwise, lawyering against economically or politically powerful actors may be too easily thwarted.
A. Public Interest Lawyering in For-Profit Settings
Empirical research complicates the dichotomized portrait of public
interest lawyering and profit-generating practice.294 Since the days of
Button and Primus, attorneys motivated by political commitments have
increasingly crafted careers not only as staff attorneys at impactlitigation funds and legal aid offices, but also as partners, associates, and
solo practitioners at private, profit-generating firms. Though all of these
lawyers share an abiding commitment to the pursuit of law as a public
profession, the form they choose varies widely, as do their explanations
of their choices. Some lawyers are candid about seeking higher salaries,
admitting that the romance of public interest lawyering proved insufficient to sustain them while sending children to college, yet others choose
alternative, for-profit structures as integral to their public interest
goals.295 Those choices reflect diversifying definitions of public interest
practice.296
To some degree, the development of for-profit, fee-based structures
represents an increasingly pluralist approach to the delivery of services.297 One might charge low-income clients a fee on the view that
paying even a small sum encourages clients to be more active in their
cases and take ownership of the process by which they participate in the
legal system. For low-income clients, paying a small fee can increase
their agency and improve their relationships with their lawyers. By paying, clients may be in a better position to make demands of their lawyers,
shifting the paradigm away from the traditional power dynamics between
public interest lawyers and their indebted non-paying clients. In this way,
the presence of the fee, rather than the absence of the fee, contributes to
the public interest nature of the lawyering.298
Another area of developing for-profit practice has been firms serving particular demographic groups. As the Supreme Court noted in Button, the NAACP LDF at that time did not handle “ordinary” litigation,
only cases where the substance of the claims or defenses related to racial
294. See Ann Southworth, What Is Public Interest Law? Empirical Perspectives on an Old
Question (Univ. of Cal., Irvine Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2013-106,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256719.
295. See Trubek, supra note 12, at 429–32; Trubek & Kransberger, supra note 10, at 202–03.
296. See Cummings, supra note 14, at 9–11; Scott L. Cummings, What Good Are Lawyers?, in
THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 1, 4–10 (Scott L.
Cummings ed., 2011).
297. Until 1992, non-profit, tax-exempt legal services organizations were not permitted to
accept fees from clients. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411 § 2(05)–(06); see also COUNCIL FOR
PUB. INTEREST LAW, supra note 26, at 306–11 (describing IRS restrictions on client-based fees for
public interest law centers and the Council’s recommendation to relax the restrictions).
298. See Trubek & Kransberger, supra note 10, at 209.
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justice. Some lawyers, however, view the provision of legal services to
particular client populations as a vital form of public interest lawyering,
regardless of the substance of the individual cases.299 If a lawyer wants to
dedicate herself to racial justice, the NAACP LDF may offer the best
opportunities, and, similarly, if she wants to work for women’s rights,
then Legal Momentum (formerly NOW LDF) is an excellent forum. Yet,
if one believes in increasing the relative power of certain segments of the
population, a small, for-profit organization may provide the means to do
it. As with the acceptance of a fee, the for-profit firm may provide an
important avenue for democratic, public interest lawyering.300
Beyond using profit structures to more freely pursue empowerment
for a client population, the pursuit of economic power can itself be understood as a function of public interest lawyering.
B. Economic Strength and Independence
Certain categories of public interest lawyering require economic
strength and independence. In particular, fact-intensive civil litigation
requires significant resources, and challenging powerful corporate interests requires independence from those interests. Non-profit organizations
and volunteer services of conventional lawyers both contribute valuable
legal services that increase access for clients unable to afford representation, but each carries its own limitations due to its economically devalued
and dependent position in the legal market.301

299. Trubek, supra note 12, at 418; see Trubek & Kransberger, supra note 10, at 207–08.
300. See Trubek & Kransberger, supra note 10, at 208–09.
301. The fee-shifting model of public interest lawyering also carries special vulnerabilities and
challenges, and the Supreme Court has not offered consistent support. First, the Supreme Court ruled
in Buckhannon that serving as a catalyst for change in a defendant’s behavior is not sufficient to
prevail and be entitled to fees; rather, an attorney must obtain a judgment against the defendant.
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600,
610 (2001). This means that an attorney can consult with a client regarding violation of an important
public policy, reach out to the bad actor to request that it cease its unlawful conduct, draft and file a
complaint, litigate a case through discovery and up through trial, and then, if a defendant “chooses”
to change its conduct, the attorney representing the plaintiff will receive no fees. This seems odd
given the public interest in ensuring compliance with public policy and the lawyer’s role in forcing
the defendant to comply. It makes taking on these public interest cases much riskier for attorneys
representing clients not paying out of pocket. Catherine Albiston and Laura Beth Nielsen have
demonstrated that the financial impact of the Buckhannon decision has in fact curtailed public interest lawyers’ activity. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 212, at 1120–21.
Another challenge of the fee-shifting model of public interest lawyering is that civil litigation increasingly ends in settlement and defendants can condition settlements on the sacrifice of
payment for plaintiffs’ lawyers. If such an offer otherwise satisfies a plaintiff’s interests, it can be
difficult to refuse. Yet in the aggregate, these sacrificial offers threaten to defund this category of
public interest lawyering. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734–36, 742–43 (1986) (permitting
sacrifice offers); id. at 754–55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority decision would
have damaging aggregate effects for enforcement of civil rights laws). For further discussion of
Court-condoned obstacles to the recovery of fees for public interest lawyering, see infra Part IV.C.
See also Cummings, supra note 14 at 89 (describing terms of one firm’s retainer, which prohibits
acceptance of sacrifice offers and provides for contingency fees in the absence of fees from statutory
awards).
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The accumulation of economic power is particularly important
preparation for successful litigation against wealthy corporate defendants. Civil litigation is often an expensive proposition, and for any public
interest lawyer to serve as a serious gladiator, she must bring the resources to fight as aggressively and persistently as her adversaries. Cases
involving multiple parties and complex factual disputes can create insurmountable challenges for a firm without ample financial resources.302
Even where fee-shifting provisions offer the possibility of fees after prevailing, the firm needs to have sufficient resources to survive until the
time of any such payout. In the meantime, salaries and other overhead
costs must be covered, and the firm must be financially prepared to absorb the full cost of the suit if, for any reason, the client does not prevail.
This is all the more daunting given the Supreme Court’s limited interpretation of what it means to prevail.303
To the extent that public interest lawyering includes litigation to
change industry standards,304 economic power is a prerequisite.305 Qualitative empirical research shows examples of lawyers who have migrated
from legal aid offices to large firms precisely because they believe they
can lodge more powerful attacks on corporate wrongdoers when armed

A number of these obstacles could potentially be addressed through legislation, but deeper, structural challenges remain. Because fee-shifting statutes encourage lawyers to litigate cases
they are likely to win, the fee-shifting model does not necessarily support the pursuit of risky cases
or clients. Yet risk may be involved in impact litigation seeking to change the law. Risk may also be
required to represent marginalized clients whose voices are less likely than more privileged members
of society to receive respect and empathy. If there is hope of public interest lawyering for social
change, it must, at least sometimes, take on risks. One way lawyers can pursue risky cases under the
fee-shifting model (or a contingency fee model), is if they support the risky work by balancing it
with less risky matters. See Cummings, supra note 14, at 61 (describing how one firm develops
portfolio of cases so it can pursue some riskier cases). Nonetheless, were fee-shifting statutes the
only form of support for public interest lawyering, certain categories of wrongs might go unaddressed. Notably, this Article does not argue that fee-shifting is categorically superior to other
forms of public interest lawyering but simply that it ought to be recognized and supported as one
important form.
302. See COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, supra note 26, at 143.
303. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603–05 (ruling that, even if litigation is the catalyst for
change in defendant’s behavior, plaintiff does not “prevail” for purposes of fee-shifting statute
unless plaintiff obtains judgment against defendant (internal quotation mark omitted)); see also
Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989) (holding that, in Title VII class
action where intervenor unsuccessfully challenged settlement, plaintiffs could not recover fees
without showing intervenor’s claim to be “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation”); Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 212, at 1130 (documenting empirically that the Buckhannon decision has
limited lawyers’ case selection). For more evidence that these fee decisions do have an impact, see
Brand, supra note 212, at 361–62.
304. See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 199, at 96.
305. To the extent that litigation remains a viable avenue for social change, today’s most successful approach may be to exact economic costs from private entities, rather than to seek ongoing
injunctions against government actors. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (questioning the extent to which the
judiciary can affect social change). But see Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Failure of Institutional Reform Litigation After Horne v. Flores, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1435, 1444–48 (2013) (describing ongoing importance of institutional reform
litigation against government actors).
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with larger war chests.306 Some might question whether attorneys earning
handsome salaries at large firms deserve recognition as public interest
lawyers. But access to justice should mean more than individual representation,307 and, to the extent that structural change remains a recognized goal of public interest lawyering,308 the enforcement and deterrent
values served by economically powerful actors should not be overlooked.
Such actors may be uniquely positioned to challenge corporate and government entities with significant power of their own.
Like economic strength, economic independence also improves
public interest lawyering.309 Financial dependence can limit the nature
and scope of activity. To receive tax benefits as a non-profit, an organization must agree not to lobby or organize more than a limited amount.310
Private donors, whether foundations offering grants, or members paying
dues, can impose their priorities on the use of funds.311 Both government
actors and financial benefactors have been known to censor controversial
public interest lawyering.312 In contrast, a lawyer who earns her income
directly from public interest lawyering is beholden to no one but her clients. This not only increases the clients’ power in the representation relationship but also decreases the power of outside influences.313 For public
306. See Erichson, supra note 5, at 2101 n.63.
307. See Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 875
(2004).
308. See ROSENBERG, supra note 305, at 32–33 (suggesting courts may be able to produce
social change when paired with market incentives and deterrents).
309. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 11 (2012) (“To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is
obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession’s independence from government
domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under
law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not
dependent on government for the right to practice.” (emphasis added)).
310. See supra notes 81, 85–86 and accompanying text.
311. For a discussion of the challenges of alternative funding sources, see CHEN & CUMMINGS,
supra note 10, at 128–42, 174, 184–86, and SCHEINGOLD, supra note 1, at 194–99.
312. In one important example of how public interest lawyers’ activities have been restricted
by funders, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) in 1996 imposed a variety of restrictions on all
lawyers in offices receiving LSC funding. Luban, supra note 4, at 220–24. These restrictions ranged
from censoring the substance of the cases (no constitutional challenges to welfare regulations) to
limiting the client population to be served (no representation of undocumented immigrants except in
limited domestic violence matters) to cutting off access to other sources of support (no collection of
fees under fee-shifting statutes). Id. at 221, 224.
313. See Debra S. Katz & Lynne Bernabei, Practicing Public Interest Law in a Private Public
Interest Law Firm: The Ideal Setting to Challenge the Power, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 293, 294–97
(1993) (describing the authors’ for-profit firm, independent of funders or a Board of Directors, as the
best structure to represent clients with “a vital interest in shaking up the system” and provide “representation [that] necessarily involves aggressively challenging the existing power structures and
institutions”). It should be recognized that even if, in an attempt to maintain independence from
government actors and foundations, a legal services provider relies on fees, government choices still
influence the success of that effort. At the most basic level, legislatures and courts determine which
legal claims and defenses are cognizable and which damages are available. One example is feeshifting provisions, which depend on the legislature to recognize the enforcement of particular laws
as in the public interest and the judiciary to cooperate in awarding fees. Even the contingency fee,
which may be one of the more independent sources of funding, is subject to legislative support or
reduction. Capping awards, for example, can make those cases financially infeasible. See, e.g.,
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interest lawyering to be free to challenge the power of governments and
corporations, both economic strength and economic independence may
be crucial.314
Neither non-profit organizations nor conventional firms engaged in
pro bono activity can perform all public interest lawyering functions. The
structure of non-profits creates limits and presents special challenges for
capacity building.315 Funding uncertainty and dependency can make it
hard to build new programs, take risks with existing programs, and establish and maintain relationships with individuals and other organizations.316 Securing and maintaining funding also is time-consuming and
requires expertise.317 This can strain the resources of staff time and salary
budgets.318 Further, attracting and retaining well-qualified employees can
be difficult for non-profit organizations requiring long hours but paying
low salaries.319 Due to the contingent nature of funding, the security of
positions may be difficult to guarantee; the lack of job security discourages potential applicants and creates stress and anxiety for current workers.320 These difficulties can lead to a high rate of employee turnover,
creating a workforce with a lack of expertise and further increasing administrative costs.321 Additional costs tie up resources that an organization could otherwise devote to expanding its public interest lawyering.
Certainly, many non-profit organizations do attract and retain highly
intelligent, skilled, and dedicated staffs, and many do operate with impressive budgets. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that, even
for elite non-profits, obtaining and maintaining donations can be a challenge.322
For PILFs, these structural challenges make industry-changing litigation difficult. Donating for discovery costs does not appeal to funders
Bloom, supra note 199, at 108 (describing reform legislation proposed in response to litigation that
was too successful).
314. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 60, at 163 (suggesting that plaintiffs’ class action
lawyers “use their wealth to finance further class action litigation against U.S. companies” and
“comprise the most effective lobbying counterweight to corporate interests in [American] politics”).
315. See VENTURE PHILANTHROPY PARTNERS, EFFECTIVE CAPACITY BUILDING IN NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS
33–36
(2001),
available
at
http://www.vppartners.org/sites/default/files/reports/full_rpt.pdf (describing model of defining and
evaluating “nonprofit capacity”).
316. See Rhode, supra note 71, at 2056.
317. Id.
318. Nell Edgington, Overcoming the Catch-22 of Nonprofit Capacity, SOCIAL VELOCITY
(Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.socialvelocity.net/2011/08/overcoming-the-catch-22-of-nonprofitcapacity/.
319. Cf. VENTURE PHILANTHROPY PARTNERS, supra note 315, at 49–53 (explaining how some
organizations overcome recruiting challenges).
320. Cf. id. (explaining how some non-profits have attracted professionals by providing benefits packages and generous compensation).
321. Cf. id. (demonstrating that some organizations have overcome human resource challenges
through innovative programs).
322. See Rhode, supra note 71, at 2056 (describing fundraising challenges for even the most
elite, wealthy organizations).
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choosing among worthy causes. Simply amassing enough funds for these
cases may be an insurmountable obstacle. The unreliability of funding
can make it difficult to commit to a large piece of litigation, particularly
one that is risky or controversial. To responsibly accept a large case, an
organization must be in a suitable position, financially and in terms of
available labor. In the early stages of case selection, the number of hours
and years a case might demand will be uncertain, and this, in addition to
the risk of losing, must be weighed. The capacity to absorb the costs of
the case, in the event of a failure to prevail, is essential to public interest
lawyering of this kind.
Beyond the structural challenges inherent in operating a non-profit,
PILFs face additional regulatory restrictions. Although Congress created
fee-shifting statutes to make certain categories of public interest lawyering profitable, the IRS limits the ability of PILFs to use fees from such
cases for that purpose. To maintain the tax benefits of non-profit status, a
PILF must cover no more than fifty percent of its operating costs with
attorneys’ fees, and it must receive at least half of its financial support
from outside, non-client sources.323 This means both its economic
strength and its economic independence are necessarily curtailed.
Pro bono volunteer work by large, conventional law firms cannot
fill the gaps of the non-profit sector. First, while the non-profit setting
suffers from one kind of employee problem, pro bono suffers from another. Volunteer lawyers often lack relevant expertise.324 Firms lack sufficient incentives to provide robust training because the clients, if they
even know enough to identify its absence, cannot threaten to take their
business elsewhere. The firms often see pro bono as a vehicle for acquiring skills; firms generally do not allow inexperienced lawyers to “practice on” paying clients.325 In the interest of avoiding conflicts, attorneys
typically volunteer in fields disconnected from the main of their work.326
The disconnect between the fields of the attorney’s paid and volunteer
work can further stunt the development of expertise in the fields pursued
pro bono.
Excellent representation requires knowledge and commitment, both
of which are more likely to flourish when the legal services are central to
an attorney’s practice, rather than provided on a voluntary basis. As U.S.
District Judge Myron Thompson explained in the context of awarding

323. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411 § 4(05).
324. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 71, at 2395 (documenting inadequate knowledge and
supervision of volunteer attorneys); Rhode, supra note 71, at 2071–72 (documenting scarcity of
volunteer attorneys with relevant skills and inefficiencies of work by inexperienced counsel); cf.
Cummings & Rhode, supra note 71, at 2429 (documenting that some firms seek to develop expertise
in particular areas and channel volunteer efforts in those directions).
325. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 71, at 2426–28.
326. Id. at 2393.
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fees to lawyers who successfully represented victims of employment
discrimination:
Both local and national pools of plaintiffs’ lawyers, with an in depth
knowledge about the theory and practice of employment discrimination law, are essential if the plaintiffs’ perspective is to be fully and
adequately represented both in court, in cases presenting new and
complex legal issues, and out of court, before national and state legislative committees and before national and local bar committees
where policy decisions affecting the direction of employment discrimination law are made. Fees in employment discrimination cases
should therefore be awarded so a lawyer can litigate such cases for a
327
living rather than as occasional charity work.

Beyond the question of expertise, volunteers sometimes demonstrate less zeal than when they are doing their “real jobs.”328 Perhaps
because they believe they are doing a good deed by engaging in charity,
they approach the exploration of various strategic options and other
components of zealous advocacy as voluntary. As a result, the quality of
the legal services may suffer, as may the achievement of the broader
aims of public interest lawyering.329
Additionally, although big-firm lawyers working pro bono may
have more economic strength for litigation than their counterparts at nonprofit organizations, economic independence for conventional lawyers is
illusory. Conventional for-profit firms function to amass profit; they seek
to secure and maintain paying clients, preferably as many as possible,
paying fees as high as possible. Not surprisingly, paying clients take priority over those receiving free representation. In the selection and pursuit
of pro bono work, big-firm lawyers first examine their dockets of paying
clients and then seek out pro bono activity that raises no potential conflict, as opposed to taking on these responsibilities in the opposite order.
Lawyers have withdrawn in the middle of pro bono representation due to
conflict with a paying client.330 In this way, the economic devaluation of
pro bono results in the devaluation of the work in terms of the ethical
expectations of the profession.

327. Stokes v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 706 F. Supp. 811, 817 (M.D. Ala. 1988), aff'd mem.,
891 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1989).
328. See Weissman, supra note 69, at 816 (describing critiques of volunteerism as an approach
to the provision of legal services).
329. For example, if a defendant knows plaintiff’s counsel is acting pro bono and therefore will
litigate the case less aggressively, this could influence strategic choices in the litigation of the case or
in settlement. Ultimately, it might well mean that the enforcement and deterrence goals of the litigation are compromised.
330. Cummings, supra note 67, at 116–20, 147 (describing how firms decline to accept, and
sometimes withdraw from, cases that could create either actual conflicts with paying clients or even
positional conflicts with those clients’ business interests); see also Cummings & Sandefur, supra
note 67, at 102.
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Moreover, conventional firms engaged in pro bono work are so beholden to their paying clients, and the paying clients they hope to attract,
that they will not engage in litigation that threatens the positions or business interests of these client populations. Most large firms will refuse
entire categories of pro bono cases, including employment discrimination, labor rights, consumer interests, and environmental claims.331
“[W]hen [conventional] firms do bring pro bono civil rights cases, they
tend to bring them against state and local governments—who have their
own in-house attorneys—rather than against private corporations for
whose business [the firms] might compete.”332 Ultimately, most large,
conventional firms will not engage in pro bono litigation that threatens
the business interests of large corporate defendants, let alone entire industries.333
C. Public Interest Practice for Profit
Congress recognized the limits of relying on charity for public interest lawyering.334 Congress believed that public interest lawyering
would have to be profitable for lawyers to pursue it with the frequency
and force required for effective enforcement and deterrence.335 The legislature passed numerous fee-shifting statutes for this reason.336 However,
the ongoing perception of public interest lawyering as free services by
non-profits and pro bono donations threatens the success of the legislature’s vision.
In a variety of decisions from the Supreme Court and lower courts,
judges have demonstrated ambivalence about awarding fees under feeshifting statutes. They have rationalized their decisions by suggesting
that public interest lawyers can be expected to act in spite of, and sometimes in opposition to, their own economic incentives.337 This overly
generous, perhaps patronizing, view of public interest lawyers contrasts
with the assumptions the judges bring to the interpretation of other ac-

331. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 71, at 2393 (amassing evidence that firms avoid employment, consumer, and environmental claims likely to involve suits against major corporations).
332. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private Attorneys General, 101 NW. U.
L. REV. 1459, 1463 (2007).
333. Weissman, supra note 69, at 816–17 (“Pro bono services, like foundation funded projects,
do not typically include representation in matters that challenge structural inequities, nor do they
seek solutions to fundamental injustices.”).
334. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 747–48 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing legislative history describing strain on legal aid organizations and unavailability of counsel); see also
Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1970) (“Congress did not intend that
vindication of statutorily guaranteed rights would depend on . . . the availability of legal assistance
from charity—individual, collective or organized. An enactment aimed at legislatively enhancing
human rights and the dignity of man through equality of treatment would hardly be served by compelling victims to seek out charitable help.”).
335. Evans, 475 U.S. at 748–52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
336. See supra note 213.
337. See supra Part II.B.2.
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tors.338 The results pose a real danger for the viability of important categories of public interest lawyering. Attorneys cannot litigate industrychanging litigation without first accumulating significant economic resources. Small, for-profit firms are the main individual enforcers of civil
rights laws,339 and they too cannot afford to pursue public interest lawyering for free.
Jeffrey Brand’s review of the Supreme Court’s fee-shifting decisions from 1976 to 1990 demonstrates the Justices’ “assumption that
public interest litigation is not part and parcel of ordinary practice, but is
more in the nature of charity or volunteer work.”340 Professor Brand
highlights a string of cases in which the Court has limited the effectiveness of fee-shifting statutes. A few examples from his analysis should
suffice to make the point.
In Marek v. Chesny,341 a Section 1983342 case brought by a father
whose son had been shot and killed by police officers, the Court held that
Rule 68 offers of judgment could cut off entitlement to fees governed by
fee-shifting statutes.343 The decision opened up the possibility of a strong
pecuniary interest on behalf of the lawyer—to settle and get paid rather
than risk years more work for no reward—that could directly oppose her
client’s interest going forward. The Marek majority acknowledged that
its holding could “serve as a disincentive for the plaintiff’s attorney to
continue litigation after the defendant makes a settlement offer,” but
surmised that “[m]erely subjecting civil rights plaintiffs to the settlement
provision of Rule 68 does not curtail their access to the courts, or significantly deter them from bringing suit.”344 In other contexts, the Court has
sought to remove conventional lawyers from situations where pecuniary
interests could test their ethical commitments; for example, the Court has
approved the general use of solicitation prohibitions.345 Nonetheless, in
the case of public interest lawyering, the Court expects a lawyer to rise
above such challenges and continue the work even if denied financial
338. See supra notes 186–99 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s approach to solicitation rules in Ohralik).
339. See Bagenstos, supra note 332, at 1460–61 (citing Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the
Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 768 (1988), and Christine Jolls, The Role and
Functioning of Public-Interest Legal Organizations in the Enforcement of the Employment Laws, in
EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 162–64 (Richard
B. Freeman et al. eds., 2005)).
340. Brand, supra note 212, at 373; see also Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 530 (1986) (describing judicial hostility in case limiting
veterans’ rights lawyers to fees of ten dollars).
341. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
342. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
343. Marek, 473 U.S. at 11–12.
344. Brand, supra note 212, at 357 n.397 (alteration in original) (quoting Marek, 473 U.S. at
10) (internal quotation marks omitted).
345. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978) (reasoning that presence of a
pecuniary motive is “inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct”).
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support. The Marek majority failed to come to terms with the ethical
conflict its decision permitted and the serious ramifications for civil
rights enforcement.
In Evans v. Jeff D.,346 the Supreme Court ruled that after years of
protracted settlement discussions in a class action concerning inadequate
education and healthcare for disabled children, defense counsel could
condition a consent decree on plaintiffs’ counsel waiving all costs and
attorneys’ fees.347 The majority claimed to be “cognizant of the possibility that decisions by individual clients to bargain away fee awards may,
in the aggregate and in the long run, diminish lawyers’ expectations of
statutory fees in civil rights cases,” but the majority determined that the
likelihood of such a result was remote.348
Again, the Court’s analysis suggested public interest lawyers have
no pecuniary needs. The Jeff D. plaintiffs had sought an injunction to
repair educational and health care systems but requested no monetary
damages, other than payment of the fees and costs accumulated during
the litigation.349 Three years into the case and one week before trial, the
defendants offered injunctive relief in exchange for a waiver of fees and
costs.350 Given the offer of virtually everything the plaintiffs wanted,
their attorney felt ethically bound to advise his clients to accept, even if
that meant his office had to absorb the accumulated costs of the litigation.351 The parties agreed to a settlement that made the waiver of fees
and costs conditional on the court’s approval.352 The plaintiffs’ counsel
then filed a motion asking the court to order the defendant to pay costs
and fees.353 He argued that requiring his office to absorb these expenses
when the plaintiffs had essentially prevailed—after years of litigation
fueled by thousands of hours of public interest lawyering of the kind
encouraged by Congress—undermined the spirit of the fee shifting provisions.354 The lower court and Supreme Court rejected this argument.355
The majority ruled that plaintiffs’ counsel faced no ethical “dilemma” because he had “no ethical obligation” to recover statutory fees.356
This approach suggests that ensuring payment for public interest lawyers
has no broader purpose, or at least that removing payment would have no
impact on that broader purpose. And yet the fee-shifting provisions were
346.
347.
348.
dence).
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

475 U.S. 717 (1986).
Id. at 721–28.
Id. at 741 & n.34. But see id. at 754–55 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (pointing to such eviId. at 721 (majority opinion).
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 723.
See id.
Id. at 723–24, 728.
Id. at 728 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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adopted precisely because this is not a realistic approach to human behavior. In fact, contrary to the Jeff D. majority’s assertion that there was
no evidentiary basis for the concerns that the decision could have an “aggregate” effect, the legislative history of the Fees Act does include such
evidence.357
Nonetheless, in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Counsel
for Clean Air,358 a case that limited the calculation of awards under the
fee-shifting provision of the Clean Air Act,359 the plurality again assumed that profit has minimal impact on public interest lawyering.360 In
this case, the plaintiffs’ counsel, after prevailing, argued that calculation
of their fee should reflect the level of risk the attorneys absorbed by accepting a case with slim chances of success (and winning it).361 The
Court, in a fractured opinion, restricted the availability of such a risk
enhancement.362 Confronted with the point that such a decision would
dim prospects for future representation in similarly meritorious but risky
cases, the plurality explained, “[W]ithout the promise of risk enhancement some lawyers will decline to take cases; but we doubt that the bar
in general will so often be unable to respond that the goal of the feeshifting statutes will not be achieved.”363 In referring to “the bar in general,” the Justices seem to suggest that even if fees are not available, the
profession can expect someone to step in and take these cases. Perhaps
the Justices expect non-profit organizations to rely on donors for support,
or perhaps they imagine that for-profit organizations will pursue these
cases pro bono. Yet, the costs and risks of such lengthy and complex
environmental cases make them infeasible without financial support.
Professor Brand identified “a deeply held view that public interest
lawyers should be expected to act on a higher moral plane and should not
be subject to the same economic pressures as other practicing civil litigators.”364 Building on that observation, Sam Bagenstos has also suggested
that more recent decisions reflect “a fundamentally prissy, goo-goo”
view of civil rights lawyers as pious devotees who should not be moti-

357. See id. at 741 n.34; see also Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 212 (documenting empirically
that the Buckhannon decision has limited lawyers’ case selection). For more evidence on the fact that
these fee decisions do have an impact, see Brand, supra note 212, at 361–62.
358. 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
359. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2012).
360. Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 727.
361. See id. at 714; id. at 740–42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 734 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
363. See Brand, supra note 212, at 355 n.387 (quoting Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 727 (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
364. Id. at 373. See also Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 193–94 (2d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that public interest cases should garner lower
fees than regular lodestar because lawyers have other incentives to do the cases). But see Perdue v.
Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 546 (2010) (holding that fee-shifting statutes may be used to increase
attorneys’ fees in extraordinary situations).
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vated by financial interests.365 The issue goes beyond civil rights lawyers
to public interest lawyering more generally, and to a deeper difficulty
with reconciling public interest lawyering and profit. To be clear, in the
case of civil rights,366 the problem is likely compounded by some judges’
distaste for this particular type of work and perhaps their doubts as to
whether the litigation does serve the public interest. Yet it should not be
overlooked that the view of public interest lawyering as pious, a view
often perpetuated by non-profit and conventional lawyers alike, helps to
buttress the judges’ decisions.
The common confusion about the definition of public interest lawyering has significant real-world consequences. If we keep in mind that
fee-shifting statutes are designed for more than the individual litigants
and are aimed at the broader public interest, it is harder to paint the lawyers as greedy for seeking financial compensation,367 and harder to shrug
off the aggregate public impact of refusing to provide this support. The
view of public interest lawyering as a charitable endeavor may be clouding the judges’ thinking. Moreover, the widespread acceptance of that
view obscures the reality that fee-limiting decisions are, intentionally or
not, defunding public interest lawyering and “taking out the adversary”368
of corporate and government power.
CONCLUSION
369

With few exceptions, the legal profession understands public interest lawyering as charity work donated by non-profits or volunteers,
operating outside the market for legal services. Defining public interest
work in terms of the absence of pecuniary gain neglects the substantive
value of the work. This understanding not only is incomplete, but also
damages the pursuit of public interest law and, ultimately, the profession.
It threatens the viability of important public interest lawyering work because it fosters an environment in which public interest lawyers seeking

365. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Thurgood Marshall, Meet Adam Smith: How Fee-Shifting Statutes
Provide a Market-Based System for Promoting Access to Justice (Though Some Judges Don’t Get It)
4–5 (Univ. of Michigan Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 150,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407275; Bagenstos, supra note 332, at 1464–66; see
Brand, supra note 212, at 373–75.
366. See Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What Is “Reasonable”?, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 281, 310 (1977) (pointing out that antitrust lawyers received statutory fees averaging
$181 per hour, while those engaged in comparable civil rights litigation were compensated at the rate
of $40 per hour).
367. See Reda, supra note 247, at 1116–17 (collecting literature).
368. See Luban, supra note 4, at 213 (internal quotation marks omitted).
369. One increasingly dynamic area is law schools’ loan repayment assistance programs. See
sources cited supra note 9. Roughly one quarter of the top 50 law schools in the United States currently recognize for-profit work as public interest, depending on the substance of the firms’ dockets.
Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Loan Repayment Eligibility Requirements and Their Implications (unpublished
report) (on file with author). Eligibility requirements of most law schools’ loan repayment programs
can be found on the schools’ websites.
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market-rate fees encounter skepticism.370 If they cannot collect fees, they
will remain beholden to powerful economic and political actors who can
limit, and historically have limited, their work.371
The dichotomized view of public interest lawyering and making a
profit also threatens the profession as a whole. Despite the many lawyers
who need work and the large quantity of work worth doing, there is
dwindling funding to connect the two.372 Defining public interest lawyering as an activity divorced from independent economic support makes it
unavailable to most as a career. Developing a more nuanced and flexible
approach could broaden the professional outlook.
There are various opportunities, from pro bono awards to financial
subsidies, where the legal profession can and should explore the question
of which lawyering to promote in the public interest. The answers should
be context-specific and will necessarily reflect and promote the values of
the institutions involved.373 While the definitional project will be challenging,374 and people will disagree,375 if we recognize doing good as a
duty of the legal profession, it is necessary to struggle with what that
means.

370. See Bagenstos, supra note 365, at 4–5; Bagenstos, supra note 332, at 1464–66; Brand,
supra note 212, at 373–75.
371. See Luban, supra note 4, at 241–44. It must be recognized that public interest lawyering in
profit-generating settings carries its own challenges. Certain categories of cases or clients may
receive lower priority or be neglected completely. See supra note 301 (describing risk-aversion of
lawyers seeking fees); supra note 331 and accompanying text (describing how for-profit firms reject
employment and environmental cases perceived to create conflicts of interest with industry clients);
Cummings, supra note 14, at 90 (describing how the search for profit causes a firm to prioritize
cases seeking monetary damages over cases seeking injunctive relief, because of the difference in
availability of contingency fees); Cummings, supra note 14, at 91 (suggesting that “privatizing
[public interest lawyering] may produce better litigation [but] not better social outcomes”). To be
clear, this Article does not argue that fee-based, for-profit models of public interest lawyering are
superior to all others; rather, it suggests that such models offer particular strengths for particular
contexts, and ought to be recognized and supported as one important form of public interest lawyering among others.
372. See generally STEVEN J. HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRISIS, 3
(2013); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
373. See CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 10, at 7 (arguing that the term “public interest law . . .
asserts a vision (or multiple visions) of the good society, and frames the definitional question in
historically grounded and institutionally specific terms”) (internal punctuation omitted).
374. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 4, at 210 n.1; Esquivel, supra note 15, at 328. Drawing on
comparative law literature may help us to approach this challenge in new and creative ways. See,
e.g., Po Jen Yap & Holning Lau, Public Interest Litigation in Asia: An Overview, in PUBLIC
INTEREST LITIGATION IN ASIA 1, 2 (Po Jen Yap & Holning Lau eds., 2011) (explaining that standing
doctrine in Hong Kong and India depend on defining public interest lawyering).
375. See Houck, supra note 12, at 1420–21 (arguing that non-profit organizations supporting
corporate interests should not be recognized as PILFs because they do not increase access for underrepresented groups or interests); Southworth, supra note 16, at 1250–52 (explaining that progressive legislation does not represent a universally recognized public interest but instead reflects distributional priorities with which conservative members of the public disagree).

